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DECONSTRUCTING PRINCIPLES FOUNDATIONAL TO
THE PARADOX OF FREEDOM-A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF UNITED STATES AND GERMAN
SUBVERSIVE PARTY DECISIONS
Eric C. Schneider*
INTRODUCTION
Over half a century ago, the legal realists exposed the subjective and
indeterminate nature of traditional legal analysis.' Further investigation by
contemporary realists2 has not been a source of comfort to those interested
in keeping alive the impression that we are governed by the rule of law
rather than by subjective pronouncements.' Deductive reasoning has been
rejected because the syllogistic logic it requires is based on premises that are
created rather than given. 4 Inductive reasoning was found to be inappropriate
since legal decisions are not solely the result of observation and are based
on "legal rules and personal judicial judgment" rather than on empirical
evidence alone.' Analogical reasoning was questionable since the finding of
similarity between any two fact patterns is more psychological than logical.
6
In reaction to the realists' view that legal analysis is predicated on sub-
concious psychological processes, the legal community has attempted to
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., University of
Connecticut; LL.B. University of California, Hastings; LL.M. New York University.
The author thanks Professors Christopher Stone and Mark Tushnet for their suggestions and
criticisms of prior drafts.
1. Legal realism was described by one of its proponents with these remarks:
Realism introduced a sharp distinction between what courts say and what they
actually do. Only the latter counts . . . . Law became the behavior pattern of judges
and similar officials. Fortunately, legal realism did not stop at this empiricism. It
developed and perfected the functional approach. Realists focused their attention
on whether a decision had given due weight to considerations of public policy.
Kessler, Theoretic Bases of Law, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 98, 109 (1941).
2. For a brief history of legal realism, see Van Volkenburg, Law Teachers, Law Students,
and Litigation, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 584, 594-97 (1984). See, e.g., Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821-49 (1935) (contemporary
view of functioning of legal realist method).
3. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 71-72 (1980); see also Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (describing present conflict between
traditional objectivist jurisprudence and contemporary policy-making adjudication); Tushnet,
Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV.
623 (1984) (reviewing historical and ongoing discomfort of centrist legal scholars with legal
realists and critical theorists); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 76-100 (1975) (liberal
presupposition of individual subjective interests undercuts liberal system of law).
4. H. BERMAN & W. GREINER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 415 (3d ed. 1972).
5. Hermann, A Structuralist Approach to Legal Reasoning, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1131, 1137
(1975).
6. Id. at 1138-39.
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construct "fundamental reasons of principle on which to base men's ac-
tions-which should cut across men's uncontrolled instincts and interests.'' 7
Thus, the same concern about arbitrary ethical choice in decision making
that caused the early positivists to stress legislation as the primary source of
law' has prompted recent efforts in legal scholarship toward finding objec-
tifying principles that will limit the arbitrariness of judicial decision makers
when the result is not dictated by statute or clear precedent. 9
In jurisprudential writing, these efforts have been driven by dissatisfaction
with the conclusion that judicial decision making, to the extent that it is
subjective, is arbitrary, undemocratic, and, in a sense, even tyrannical.', It
7. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 82 (1962).
8. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 1 (1861 & photo reprint
1970); Stumpf, Austin's Theory of the Separation of Law and Morals, 14 VAN. L. REV. 117,
119-20 (1960); see also T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 198 (Collier ed. 1962) (civil law defined as
command of the sovereign); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 594-95 (1958) (discussing philosophical origins of utilitarianism). For an overview,
see D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 22-26 (1977).
Modern positivism has been explained as follows:
The earlier emphasis on the "command of the sovereign" has given way to the
current view that the legal system consists of rules, and perhaps of policies and
other standards whose status is determined by purely formal criteria-by their
"pedigree" as Dworkin puts it. These formal criteria identify the agencies that can
declare that particular rules or other standards are the law.
Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 976-77 (1981). See Vetter, Postwar
Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decison Making, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 412 (1983).
9. "Objectifying principles" are sources of conditions or limitations or, for our purposes,
legal methods, that restrict reasoning into predictable patterns. Professor Ronald Dworkin is a
proponent of objectifying principles in law. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-
130 (1977), in which he argues that, even in the absence of a clearly defined and accepted rule
directing a decision in a litigated case, a judge is bound to follow general principles of justice
and fairness recognized by the social order which, although not expressed in positive law,
impose substantial limits on judicial freedom. See also E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 106
(rev. ed. 1974) (elaborating on Dworkin's views). Another proponent of objectifying principles
in law, Judge Robert Bork, supports limits that constrain courts to their narrowest adjudicatory
function and sharply limit judicial review. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 1-6 (1971) (supporting objectifying principles as a guard against a
judicial "coup d'etat"). But see Kalven, Robert Bork and the Constitution, 1983 NATION 262
(critical review of Bork's "neutral principles").
Some criticism of objectifying principles is made among its supporters. See Ely, Professor
Dworkin's External/Personal Preference Distinction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 959, 984-86 (criticizing
Dworkin's assumption that all forms of external pressure on judges are equally harmful to the
judiciary). Most criticism, however, has stemmed from the critical theorists. See Brest, The
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) (no defensible criteria exist for limiting judicial review
of due process fundamental rights); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1205-08 (1981) (legal scholarship stultified because of reluctance to confront reality
of subjective choice); see also Fletcher, supra note 8, at 970 (scholar's choice between support
or criticism of objectifying principles depends on implicit assumptions about nature of law).
10. See D. SCHAEFER, JUSTICE OR TYRANNY? 97-101 (1979); Schuster, Die Rolle Des Bun-
desverfassungsgerichts Beim Abbau Der Burgerlichen Demokratie in Der BRD, 28 STAAT U.
RECHT 35 (1979) (critical analysis of West German Constitutional Court by East German,
describing court as "undemocratic" and an "instrument of the ruling classes" because it is
"free of the ups and downs (Wechselfallen) of elections and of legislative and executive
realities").
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has been suggested, however, that our fear of arbitrary judicial decision
making should not cause us to lose sight of the more central underlying
issue: whether there are general principles that restrain or direct decision
makers, whether those decision makers are judicial, legislative or adminis-
trative." Certainly Judge Cardozo, faced with Dworkin's Herculean task of
deciding an issue for which there was no clear precedent, felt the same
restraints and used the same guides as legislators. 2
In their search for objective principles, recent contributors to legal liter-
ature have suggested various objectifying sources for the law. Theories of
sociology, economics, history, and psychology'3 have been utilized as well
as the more traditional comparative method.' 4 Legal scholars are concerned
with the subjective or objective nature of law; that is, whether there are
transcendent principles on which to base decisions. This concern is, not
surprisingly, only one manifestation of a central issue of Western philo-
sophical discussion. Recently, the focus of this discussion has been directed
by linguistic philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and Jonathan Culler."
The purpose of this paper is to review some of these recent developments
of linguistic theory and to indicate and demonstrate their possible effects on
legal analysis through the use of the comparative method. The comparative
method, which shows different cultures coming to different solutions for a
I1. Hughes, The Great American Legal Scholarship Bazaar, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 424, 427
(1983) (self-deception involved in exaggerated monocular view of law in American jurisprudence
as judicial decisions has also narrowed the range and weakened the intellectual importance of
American legal scholarship).
12. Judge Cardozo said that a judge, facing a decision without precedent, "must balance
all his ingredients, his philosophy, his logic, his analogies, his history, his customs, his sense
of right, and all the rest, and adding a little here and taking out a little there, must determine,
as wisely as he can, which weight shall tip the scales." Cardozo, The Nature of The Judicial
Powers, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 176 (1947).
13. Cramption, The Place of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1983).
For examples of the application of various disciplines to legal criticism, see R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) (history); M. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 44-49 (1984);
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980) (history); Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90
YALE L.J. 1274 (1981); Leff, Law And, 87 YALE L.J, 989 (1978) (anthropology); Michelman,
Norms and Normality in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1978);
Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 CAL. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (1918);
Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights, A Critique of Rauol Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 657
(1979).
14. "Comparative method" is a process of comparing and contrasting alternative legal
systems to highlight the unique qualities of those systems. The term is used by Professor Rudolf
Schlesinger in preference to the standard term "comparative law." R. SCHLESINGER, COMPAR-
ATIVE LAW I (4th ed. 1980) (describing application of comparative method). See E. BODEN-
HEIMER, supra note 9, at 95; see also DWORKIN, Spheres of Justice: An Exchange, N.Y. REV.
BooKs, July 21, 1983, at 45-46 (disagreements as to function and distribution of goods cannot
be resolved unless we move outside our own tradition and understandings and appeal to
"general principles").
15. See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (G. Spivak trans. 1976); J. CULLER, ON
DECONSTRUCTION (1982).
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legal problem, will be used to illustrate the implications of recent linguistic
theories on the issue of objectifiable law and, thus, on legal analysis. After
recent developments in linguistic theory are summarized, three approaches
to the regulation of subversive political parties in the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany will be presented. This subject has tested the
nature of certain general principles underlying each legal system, and has
been analyzed in terms of a paradox of freedom. Put simply, the paradox
is whether democracy is justified in denying political rights and privileges to
those who, once in power, would be undemocratic.16 A conventional analysis
will be followed by a structuralist analysis. Finally, a deconstructionist
approach to the same material will aid in arriving at a fuller understanding
of the presuppositions and unspoken premises of decision makers in the
American and West German legal systems.' 7
I. THE COMPARATIVE METHOD AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
The comparative method has been recognized as an appropriate tool in
finding general principles and the rules manifesting them. Thus, the com-
parative method adds to the civilizing effects of law and the pursuit of
justice. Nevertheless, there has long been an awareness of its shortcomings.
A constant warning given by comparatists is that one cannot simply compare
the final results to reach a true understanding of the general principles that
motivate decision makers in disparate societies. Traditionally, the warning
has been that one must first become aware of differences in language,
classification, and practice and then compare those differences." The modern
linguistic philosopher would add to this list of warnings that, when trying
to understand the full implications of any derivative general principles, one
must also compare the underlying, even unconscious view of reality that is
determined by language.9
16. The paradox of freedom states "that freedom in the sense of absence of any restraining
control must lead to very great restraint, since it makes the bully free to enslave the meek." I
K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 265 n.4 (5th rev. ed. 1966); see also 3
KOMMENTAR ZUM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 32 (1976) (contradictory principles of political order's
preservation and openness to historical change can be reconciled only through practical political
reason, careful progress, and piecemeal change). Cf. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free
Speech, 10 Sw. U.L. REV. 227, 239 (1978) ("no satisfactory theory of free speech can presuppose
or guarantee the permanent existence of any particular social system").
17. Structuralists, using linguistics as a model, "attempt to develop 'grammars'-systematic
inventories of elements and their possibilities of combination that would account for the form
and meaning of literary works." J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 22. Deconstructionists, however,
"investigate the way in which this project is subverted by the workings of the texts themselves.
Structuralists are convinced that systematic knowledge is possible; post structuralists [such as
deconstructionists] claim to know only the impossibility of this knowledge." Id. These definitions
are applicable to legal as well as literary critical theory.
18. See, e.g., R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 14, at 619-20.
19. For other linguistic approaches, see W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND
ETHICS (1972); R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 14, at 618-37; Stone, From a Language Perspective,
90 YALE L. J. 1149 (1981).
[Vol. 34:621
DECONSTR UCTING PRINCIPLES
Professor George Fletcher uses a traditional comparative approach to
show how differences in language can affect legal analysis.20 In arguing
against the positivist position, Professor Fletcher points out that continental
European languages employ two words for "law" while English uses only
one. That is, in European languages, one word (gesetz, loi, ley, zakon,
torveny) is used to refer to positive law such as statutes and specific customary
law.2 Another word (recht, droit, derecho, prava, jog) is used to refer to
unenacted general principles.22 This concept of law as general principles is
not found in contemporary English, Until the seventeenth century, however,
this was a meaning given to law in England and was part of the common
law. Fletcher argues that law as defined by positivists, which develops in
courts and legislatures, has as its guiding "sense" the pursuit of this universal
idea of justice.23 While the positive law is fully knowable, general principles
are open ended, transcendental, and cannot be completely known. 24 Fletcher
proposes that one should believe that law exists in this universal sense in
order to engage in "committed argument" rather than being limited to the
mere "detached observation" of the positivists.25
Professor Fletcher's arguments raise, but do not fully answer, questions
central to contemporary jurisprudence and philosophy:
1. Is there an objectifiable concept of justice to which decision makers
can refer?
2. Even if there is not, is there a sufficiently shared concept so that one
can act as though there is an objective principle and, thus, predict and
limit decision makers?
3. If we are referring to a culturally shared conclusion as to general
principles, is there any way we can avoid the tyranny of our consensus
and develop new principles without decision making appearing merely
arbitrary?
These questions are part of a philosophical discourse that goes back to
the pre-Socratics and involves the search for "certain" knowledge in math-
20. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 987-88.
21. Id. at 980.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 981.
24. Fletcher discusses the indeterminate value of general principles:
In Dworkin's terminology, rules that apply in "all or nothing" fashion are Gesetze,
whereas principles are a matter of Right. That principles have "weight" and that
judges must gauge the force of these principles in every case are characteristics of
the Right. No one can declare the principles' existence and determine the precise
weight they should carry.
Id.
25. Id. at 982. Fletcher expounds two aims of legal scholarship. "Committed argument"
postulates the existence of a transcendant law, or Right. Scholars pursue and articulate principles
that constitute this Right and thereby, stand equally with judges in assessing what the law is.
Id. at 984. "Detached observation" presumes a scholarly distancing of the commentator from
legal practice. The scholar, in this view, observes and reports the work of the legal system. Id.
at 985. Fletcher traces two examples of committed argument made in legal practice: the extension
of statutes in civil law countries to cover new principles, id. at 991-95, and the use of cases in
common law countries to support particular principles, id. at 995-99.
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ematics and morality. 26 In the early eighteenth century, David Hume, drawing
conclusions from Newton's physics, stated that it was impossible to arrive
at any definite, self-validating knowledge of the external world. This radically
skeptical position insisted that there was no necessary link between deductive
logic and the nature of real life events and experiences.27 Immanuel Kant
answered Hume's skepticism with the theory that man is in a "noumenal"
or intelligible world as well as in a sensed world, and that this noumenal
world is a basic ground or cause of the empirical world. In essence, Kant
held the noumenal world to be the real world-the thing itself; the world of
sensed data is thus secondary. Ideas and concepts are the true reality and
have an autonomous transcendental existence. 21 It is important in under-
standing the development of answers to our three questions to be aware that
many legal scholars take this Kantian approach to our first question. From
that approach, these scholars argue for a link between law and morals; they
are driven to connect law to the fundamental principles of other disciplines.2"
11. STRUCTURALISM
A new approach, structuralist methodology,3 ° has recently been developed
in various fields of human endeavor, including legal analysis. 3 The devel-
opment of structuralism has been traced to the works of the linguist Ferdi-
nand de Saussure, whose ideas are basic to the disparate fields of structuralist
thought. In lectures given between 1907 and 1911,32 Saussure observed that
26. See, e.g., R.E. ALLEN, SOCRATES AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 100-13 (1980); E. BODENHEIMER,
supra note 9, at 4-6; H. LLOYD-JONES, THE JUSTICE OF ZEUS 83-84 (1971); A. Ross, ON LAW
AND JUSTICE 233-37 (1958); A. WOOLZLEY, LAW AND OBEDIENCE, THE ARGUMENTS OF PLATO'S
CRITo 79-103 (1979) (explaining Socrates' equivalent of social contract theory).
27. See, e.g., D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (1878) (justice rests not on
reason but on "artifice and human convention").
28. E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 9, at 61-64.
29. In the area of statutory interpretation, compare Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-15 (1958) (interpreting statutes requires only an
appreciation of the ambiguity of language, without resort to general principles supporting the
law) with Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 661-69 (1958) (interpretation of law invariably tends towards reliance upon principles
of law).
30. The term "structuralism" has had varied uses. See J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 18-23
(describing various schools of criticism associated with structuralism). This paper develops an
understanding of the structuralist movement as a shift in critical thinking from subjects to
discourse. That is, to the structuralist meaning is the effect of codes and conventions-its
relation to particular structures and processes be they linguistic, psychoanalytical, metaphysical,
logical, sociological or rhetorical. Language and structures become the major source of expla-
nation. Compare F. ALLPORT, THEORIES OF PERCEPTION AND THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE 76-
77 (1955) (describing core-context theory of perception, which combines current sensation and
past images to create meaning).
31. See Leach, Fundamentals of Structuralist Theory, in SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO LAW
19-32 (Podgorecki & Whelan eds. 1981); Harris, A Structuralist Theory of Law: An Agnostic
View, in SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO LAW 33-43 (Podgorecki & Whelan eds. 1981); Heller,
Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN L. REV. 127 (1984); see also Liebersoln, Interpreting the
Interpreter, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 15, 1984, at 39.
32. F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (W. Baskin trans. 1974).
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our knowledge of the world is inextricably shaped and conditioned by the
language that serves to represent it, and that there is no self-evident, cor-
responding link between the "signifier" and the "signified", that is, between
the word and the concept it serves.33 Thus, whatever "meaning" we find or
assert is tied into a system of relationship and difference that has pre-
determined our habits of thought and even our perceptions. Our knowledge
of the world is pre-structured by our signs, by our codes, and by conventions
that we have developed to classify and organize an otherwise chaotic flow
of experience.34 Saussure's statement of the development and place of lan-
guage, a basic relativity of thought and meaning, is the core of structuralist
theory.35
Saussure denied the objective existence of justice, answering "No" to our
first question, and posited a relativity of meaning as the premise to answering
the second question. Since Saussure, however, other philosophers uncom-
fortable with this conclusion have proposed different and conflicting answers
to our second question-solutions to the problem of locating a shared concept
of justice. Edmund Husserl thought that philosophy could work back to a
logic of meaning and experience that could be derived from the "immediate
data of consciousness itself."36 His phenomenology assumed that there are
"structures of experience and judgment" that are beyond question, and he
tried to capture these structures by "bracketing or suspending" all other
structures as possible delusions.37 Husserl hoped that he could isolate and
describe pure and indubitable structures of experience by examining the
33. Culler offers this synopsis of Saussure's theory of language:
Saussure begins by defining language as a system of signs. Noises count as language
only when they serve to express or communicate ideas, and thus the central question
for him becomes the nature of the sign: what gives it its identity and enables it to
function as sign. He argues that signs are arbitrary and conventional and that each
is defined not by essential properties but by the differences that distinguish it from
other signs. A language is thus conceived as a system of differences, and this leads
to the development of the distinctions on which structuralism and semiotics have
relied: between a language as a system of differences (langue) and the speech events
which the system makes possible (parole), between the study of the language as a
system at any given time (synchronic) and study of the correlations between elements
from different historical periods (diachronic), between two types of differences
within the system, syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, and between the two
constituents of the sign, signifier and signified. These basic distinctions together
constitute the linguistic and semiotic project of accounting for linguistic events by
making explicit the system of relations that makes them possible.
J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 98. Accord, R. COWARD & J. ELLIS, LANGUAGE AND MATERIALISM:
DEVELOPMENTS IN SEMIOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF THE SUBJECT 13 (1977).
34. C. NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION 25 (1982).
35. Id. at 4. Derrida argues that Saussure explicitly affirmed a logocentric conception of
the sign when Saussure said in his lectures that "the object of linguistic analysis is not defined
by the combination of the written word and the spoken word: the spoken word alone constitutes
the object." F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 23-24 (1960), quoted in J.
CULLER, supra note 15, at 100. For an account of the development of structuralism in its
many forms from Saussure's lectures, see T. HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS (1977).
36. C. NORRIS, supra note 34, at 42-43.
37. Id.
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content of his conscious experience while suspending or bracketing his belief
that his conscious experience referred to the external world.',
In the twentieth century, under the influence of Wittgenstein and Heideg-
ger, many structuralist writers have come to believe that there are no
transcendent foundations for ethics39 and that the lack of such foundations
does not really matter. Even without a transcendental ground for law and
ethics, as Wittgenstein said, "everything is just as it was. ' '41 According to
these writers, the only basic objective foundation necessary to the law is that
people are psychologically and socially constituted to use it to "state truths"
and "to give and obey orders." Although this answer to our second question
has been stated differently by various legal scholars, it is most eloquently
put by Noam Chomsky: "linguistic structures are innately programmed in
the human mind and operate both as a constraint upon language and as a
means of shared understanding." 4 2 Thus, according to Levi-Strauss, analysis
in law, as in other areas of human culture, requires that one "grasp the
unconscious structure underlying each institution and each custom in order
to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other
customs.
43
Professor Donald Hermann, an exponent of a structuralist approach to
legal reasoning, 44 accepts the premise of the realists that legal analysis is the
result of a subconscious process in which rules play no simple cause and
effect role.45 He rejects, however, the realist assertion that, "because making
decisions in 'legal' terms is a rationalization for deeper mental processes,
legal reasoning must therefore be irrational. 4 6 Structuralist theory, argues
Professor Hermann, "posits the existence of . . .cognitive ordering elements
below the conscious surface." '47 Basing his position on studies by Levi-
Strauss, Professor Hermann suggests that legal analysis rests on three the-
oretical assumptions:
1. All patterns of human social behavior are codes, with the character-
istics of languages.
38. Id. at 44.
39. Allison & Garver, Preface to J. DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA xviii (1973). Placing
contemporary theorists into the structuralist or post structuralist camp is difficult. See J.
CULLER, supra note 15, at 22 (recent anthology of post structuralist criticism features writers
listed in editor's earlier bibliography of structuralism).
40. Searle, The World Turned Upside Down, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Oct. 27, 1983, at 78.
41. See, e.g., Stone, From A Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149, 1158 (1981) See
also, J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 130 ("[Wittgenstein's] admirers speak as though the language
game were itself a ground-a true presence which determined meaning").
42. R. COWARD & J. ELLIS, supra note 33, at 129.
43. C. LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOCY 21 (1963). For the application of struc-
turalist methodology to legal analysis, see Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 469 (1976), Hermann, supra note 5 and Robertshaw, Unreasonableness and Judicial
Control of Administrative Discretion, 1975 PUBLtC LAW 113 (1975).
44. Hermann, supra note 5.
45. Id. at 1140.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1142.
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2. Man has an innate structuring capacity which determines the limits
within which the structure of all types of social phenomena can be formed.
3. Relations can be reduced to binary oppositions.4
This last theoretical assumption, that relations are reducible to binary
opposites, is essential to the usefulness of structural analysis. 49 Structuralism
proposes that deep structures of the unconscious are manifested by our need
to put concepts in terms of the concept itself and its opposite. Levi-Strauss
believed that the deep structure of the relation between nature and culture
leads to conscious binary oppositions such as raw/cooked, fresh/putrid, and
even silence/noise." The argument here is not that these binary opposites
exist as such in any "real" sense, but merely that they are perceived to exist
"within special contexts, by groups who employ the terms in their myths.''
Hermann concludes that:
Myths, and, by implication, other statements of belief, such as law, present
patterns of behavior expressed through binary opposition, and from these
binary oppositions a model can be developed which explains in part what
otherwise appears to be a diverse and unintelligible body of material ....
Evolution or change in institutions . . . is explained by the process of
transformation, which operates through regularized laws whereby deep
structures are transformed into different structural configurations with
different surface expressions . . . .Transformation takes place through a
process of mediation, in which tension between binary opposites is pe-
riodically resolved by the construction of intermediate third variables.52
The construction of third variables is explained by Levi-Strauss on the
premise that binary opposites give rise to intermediate concepts due to the
tension between them. The binary opposite of life/death is transformed into
the binary opposite of agriculture/warfare and then into an intermediate
third variable concept of hunting as a mediating experience relieving the
tension." Thus, the original binary opposites become triads that must be
viewed as whole institutional systems rather than merely as disconnected
parts. These triads, in turn, can be explained only "in terms of the inter-
relationship between the parts." 54
1II. DECONSTRUCTION
The structuralist system of legal analysis claims to make intelligible all
observed facts to predict "how the model (and, theoretically, the institution
or cultural pattern under scrutiny) will react if one or more of its constituent
elements are modified." 55 Such a system is seductive. Structural analysis of
48. Id. at 1145 (quoting Lane, Introduction to INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURALISM 14 (M.
Lane ed. 1970) (emphasis added).
49. Hermann, supra note 5, at 1150-51.
50. Id. at 1148.
51. Lane, supra note 48, at 16.
52. Hermann, supra note 5, at 1153, 1159.
53. C. LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 43, at 224.
54. Hermann, supra note 5, at 1159.
55. Id. at 1160.
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the sort espoused by Professor Hermann, however, is based on the idea that
"deep structures are either innate categories of human thought or structural
processes which exist because of the basic principles by which human intel-
ligence operates." 5 6
Deconstruction has emerged as a warning response to these structuralist
assumptions. Although, like structuralism, it has its roots in Saussure's
analysis of language, proponents of the deconstructive method refuse to
accept the aroma of objectivity that insidiously invades structuralism. De-
construction, as a method, rejects the idea that structure is in any sense
objectively there or that structures of meaning correspond to some deeply
laid mental set or pattern of mind that determines intelligibility. Roland
Barthes, although himself subject to the allures of natural order, reminds
us that the dream of total intelligibility, like structure, is a sort of blindness
to one's own conceptual metaphors.17 It is this blindness or blind spot that
leads to the tyranny referred to in our third question and to which Derrida
has devoted his attentions. He has pointed out that structuralists and em-
piricists take for granted that "ideas represented by linguistic signs already
stand in logical relation to one another before we have signs to represent
them." 8 They place logic at the foundation of their theory of meaning.
Derrida, to the contrary, regards logic as merely derivative from rhetorical
considerations." For Derrida, the deconstructive method is useful in undoing
the ruling illusion of western metaphysics: that reason can somehow dispense
with language and arrive at a pure, self-authenticating truth or method. In
response to Professor Hermann, Derrida would answer that the very notion
of "structure" is a metaphor dependent, at its limit, on a willed forgetting
of its own rhetorical roots.' Structure is at best a product of a metaphorical
56. Id. at 1159.
57. C. NORRIS, supra note 34, at 10; see also J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 22 ("Structuralists
are convinced that systematic knowledge is possible; post structuralists claim to know only the
impossibility of this knowledge.").
58. Allison & Garver, supra note 39, at xi.
In these traditional terms, the central issue of philosophy of language .. .is the
issue about the relation of logic and rhetoric .... The very fact that logic and
rhetoric both have to do with the use and interpretation of signs leads us immediately
into the all important question of their relative priority: Can there be two inde-
pendent foundations for our theory of meaning? .. . In the history of Western
philosophy, the philosophy of language .. . has almost invariably been based on
logic rather than rhetoric.
Id.
59. "Derrida falls squarely within a movement which regards the role of utterances in actual
discourse as the essence of language and meaning, and which therefore regards logic as derivative
from rhetorical considerations." Id. at xxii; see also J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 222-25.
60. Derrida explains the metaphor of "structure":
[Tlhe appeal to criteria of clarity and obscurity would be enough to establish ...
that this whole philosophical delimitation of metaphor is already constructed and
worked upon by "metaphors." How would a piece of knowledge or language be
clear or obscure properly speaking? All the concepts which have played a part in
the delimitation of metaphor always have an origin and a force which are themselves
"metaphorical." The very notions of what in a discourse might be nonmetaphorical
are concepts whose force owes much to their figural attractions.
J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 147 (quoting Derrida, While Mythology, 6 NEw LITERARY HISTORY
54 (1974)).
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process, a literal expression whose figurative aspect is easily forgotten. 6 It
may be difficult to think without the use of figurative props, but to accept
props without deconstructing their effects is to risk "being interested in the
figure itself to the detriment of the play going on within it metaphorically.
62
We must be aware of the delusion created when we move metaphorically
from image to concept without subjecting that movement to full rhetorical
scrutiny.
Deconstructive method starts by dismantling the concept of binary op-
position that is central to structural analysis. This deconstructive process
does not claim that analysis in terms of binary opposition is useless. The
process merely is meant to remind us that the structuralist opposition is
based not on an objectifiable reality but, rather, on the rhetorical process
of metaphorically structuring the unconscious. The alluring logic that flows
from that self-created structure presents the danger of appearing to arrive
at an immutable truth, if not about substance, at least about the analytical
process. It is to undermine this tendency in structuralism that Derrida
deconstructs the binary opposition by examining its rhetorical roots.63
Derrida maintains that the basic determining metaphor responsible for
binary opposition has been "presence." 64 Derrida writes of the metaphor of
presence, a difficult concept requiring an analysis of the place of "self" in
the process of analysis. It is very much like trying to see oneself without the
use of the manufactured prop of a mirror. To understand the metaphor of
presence it is necessary to examine the metaphorical process and its creative
role in and through language.
Meaning in language, according to Saussure, is merely a system based on
difference in sound between "signs." '6' Derrida reminds us that meaning in
language is not only the result of phonic differences necessary to create new
signs, but also that the development of language depends on the idea that
signs never are completely settled on an absolute meaning. That is, meaning
is a product of events and, thus, is always to some extent deferred and in
a process of constant development through metaphor. 6
The construction of metaphor as used here is not merely the trick of
composition learned in grade school. What is meant is metaphor as the very
constitutive ground of language and reality; that is, metaphor as the device
by which one explains or makes "real" a phenomenon that one does not
think one fully understands in terms of what one believes one does under-
stand. Thus, without the knowable existence of basic foundations, we develop
language and concepts that serve as our reality. Through the development
of metaphor we increase our ability to deal with the unknown, and in the
61. C. NORRIS, supra note 34, at 19.
62. J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 16 (A. Bass trans. 1978).
63. J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 85-86.
64. Id. at 95.
65. See supra note 33.
66. J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 95-97; see also J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 172 (1978);
Murray, Understanding Law as Metaphor, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 714 (1984).
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process we literally create new realities or concepts. By repetition, metaphors
become labels or concepts and, thus, language and general principles are
formed. This is language not only as communication but as a tool of
perception."
The process of understanding "reality" through metaphors is actually a
process that insures us that the unfamiliar or unknown is like the familiar.
It is a step-by-step process that assures us of the security of familiarity as
we come to grips with an infinity of unknowables. We achieve a feeling of
familiarity with the unknown by substituting something familiar for the
unfamiliar through metaphor. 8
Examples of this process on a conscious level are most obviously found
in the physical sciences. Niels Bohr gathered data about the atom which was
an "unknown" (a metaphrand). To understand the atom, Bohr created a
model patterned on something familiar: the solar system (a metaphier). Bohr
then developed a theory to relate the metaphrand and metaphier. The creation
of this theory was the metaphorical process .6 9 The theory, after an accu-
mulation of new data, has turned out not to explain adequately the rela-
tionship of metaphrand and metaphier. But the model remains. The model
is only a model-neither true nor false. What is tested is its similarity to
what it is supposed to represent. As successive theories show the model to
67. The process of connecting or understanding the unknown (foundational) principles
through metaphor is evidenced by the early Greek creation of the abstraction of "law" itself.
The word or concept derives from the Greek nomnos, which originally meant the foundations
of a building. In linguistic analysis, the abstraction to be understood (law) has been called a
"metaphrand" while the thing or relation used to elucidate it (notnos or foundation) has been
called the "metaphier." See J. JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF
THE BICAMERAL MIND 48 (1976).
68. One commentator discusses the discomfort attorneys experience with ambiguity:
It is of course true that we cannot, as lawyers, deal comfortably with anything until
we have attached a label to it .... [Tlhe choice of labels is far from trivial. How
we describe something is an important part of how we perceive it .... Language
as a label is an important aspect of law as language.
Peters, Reality and the Language of Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1193, 1195 (1981). Judge Peters points
out how thinking of a security device as a trust rather than a chattle mortgage facilitated an
entirely different attitude towards commercial financing. Id. Even our abstract concept of
"liability" derives from the Latin ligare meaning to be bound by a cord. E. PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS
354 (1983). See also J. JAYNES, supra note 67, at 52 ("familiarity [of metaphorsl is the feeling
of understanding").
69. The process of the development of metaphrand is not a conscious one. Concrete
metaphiers are transformed through a process of phonic change, transforming metaphiers into
words and concepts that thereafter seem to exist in their own right. Language is thus composed
of a finite set of terms that by the process of metaphor enables us to expand our understanding
of the infinite circumstances that compose our reality. The development of abstract language
is not always obvious because the original concrete metaphier gets hidden in phonemic change
(that is, a set of language sounds with slight variations are heard as the same sound by native
speakers), and the words begin to have their own existence.
An example of the development of a common metaphier is the verb "to be." Originally in
Sanskrit bhu meant to grow or to make grow and asmi meant "to breath." Bhu has evolved
into "to be" and asmi into its irregular conjunctions of "am" and "is." See J. JAYNES supra
note 67, at 51.
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be inadequate, the model will be replaced and new theories developed. This
has occurred in the development of quantum physics. But again, understand-
ing in science is the "feeling of similarity between complicated data and a
familiar model."
70
IV. THE METAPHOR OF PRESENCE IN ANALYSIS
To understand the decision making process, it is important to understand
how one decides to accept or reject a newly presented model. The answer
to this question depends on our understanding the relationship of one's
concept of one's self in the metaphorical world.
When Derrida writes that "presence" is the ruling metaphor of philosophy,
he is referring to the metaphorical two-way process whereby we constantly
create our concept of consciousness or self and then apply it to the world
we perceive in an on-going metaphorical process. This process is based, not
on something objectively real, but on our presuppositions about self and
presence. Our concept of self and presence is thus merely a function of an
operation that works by analogue. That is, we perceive the world and know
it through metaphor. We then draw a map or make a model to represent
the metaphiers. This is not unlike the scientific model of Bohr's atom; this
is a model of all things that we feel we know well. Conscious mind is then
an analogue of what we call the real world. Through combining metaphors
we create the analogue of our selves and make ourselves comfortable in our
reality. We expand viscera to the metaphrand of mind-space, our internal
world, from the metaphier of space in the world we see. From the physical
world of getting and holding we learn to "grasp" and "see" how ideas
"fit" together. When we make decisions, we choose versions of reality
consistent with our analogue of our selves. As decision makers we carry
forward the process of making the unknowable familiar by applying our
self-structured consciousness, based on a metaphor of presence, to order our
perceptions. 7
Derrida writes that all names related to fundamentals, to principles, have
always designated the constant of a presence.7" It causes us to presume that
70. J. JAYNES, supra note 67, at 53. A theory and a model are not the same: a theory is a
relationship of the model to the things the model is supposed to represent. Id. Even in the
physical sciences, new theories and discarded models do arouse feelings of insecurity. See T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 64 (2d ed. 1970). In quantum physics, the
quantum "was a whole too big to swallow" for a large group of physicists led by one of
quantum's creators, Albert Einstein. F. WOLF, TAKING THE QUANTUM LEAP 61 (1981).
Einstein's skepticism about quantum physics evidences the deep attachments of familiarity
we have with metaphiers. Because they are part of what we consider the real world, they have
many associations that increase their air of familiarity. These associations are, of course,
transferred to the metaphrand to make it familiar. Einstein reacted to discarding a metaphier
that had causality. He was not willing to accept that reality was not real, that there was no
"out there" out there, and that the model of reality was based on a probability curve and
dependent on the observer. He held onto the old model with the famous comment, "God does
not play dice with the universe." Id. at 151.
71. J. JAYNES, supra note 67, at 66.
72. J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 279 (A. Bass trans. 1978).
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order or logic underlies meaning and, thus, makes us logocentric. Concepts
by their very nature contain logocentric myths of origin, truth, and presence
which, when uncovered, show that they are caught up in a rhetoric of
figurative props and images that entirely controls their logic. Description or
analysis becomes a process of returning to an idealized metaphor of presence
of one's self, as what is normal, pure, and standard, in order from there to
conceive of derivation and complication."3 By this process, binary opposition
of concepts comes about. This is why we invest them with hierarchical
value-self or normal is good, other or derivation is bad.
The metaphorical process here described was perhaps the intuitive basis
of Judge Cardozo's warning in Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway:7 4 "Meta-
phors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they often end by enslaving it.""7 The metaphorical process of
model and analogue creation has produced numerous similar analogues of
the self based on a premise of logic and order. We have witnessed over
time, however, a splintering in our perception of reality and the models that
best describe it. As a result different cultures have developed different
conclusions about the nature of justice and, thus, different general principles
on which cultures base their decisions. These accepted or familiar general
principles vary not only from culture to culture and from time to time but,
to a lesser extent, within a culture, from person to person, and from issue
to issue.76
What does the deconstructive method do with this process? To quote
Jonathan Culler, "to deconstruct a discourse is to show how it undermines
the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies,
by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produced the supposed
ground of argument, the key concept or premise. '"" That is, the deconstruc-
tive method is designed to remind us of the logocentric nature of our
reasoning and of our stated general principles.
Various methods can be used to deconstruct a position:"x
73. Derrida, Limited Inc., GLYPit 2, 162, 236 (1977).
74. 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1929).
75. Id. at 94, 155 N.E. at 61.
76. Leibowitz explains the importance of common language:
[T]o a people, language brings into play an entire range of experience and an
attitude toward life which can be either immensely satisfying and comforting or, if
imposed from without, threatening and forbidding. From a central government's
standpoint, a common language forges a similarity of attitude and values which
can have important unifying aspects, while different languages tend to divide and
make direction from the center more difficult.
A. LEIBOWITZ, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE 1 (1971). Bill see Dworkin,
Book Review, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 21, 1983, at 46:
Moral traditions are not clubs into which people of the world are distributed so
that everyone carries a membership card in one but only one. On the contrary,
these traditions can be defined at different levels of abstraction, and people who
belong to a common tradition at one level of abstraction will divide at another,
more concrete, level.
77. J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 88.
78. For a list of strategies see J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 213-16.
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1. Be aware of the use of any of the traditional binary oppositions in
Western intellectual history, e.g., speech/writing, male/female, truth/fic-
tion, literal/metaphoric, signified/signifier, reality/appearance. We must
be aware that at the core of logocentrism, with its obsession with rationality
and logic, is the concept of hierarchical oppositions that automatically
gives the first term superiority over the latter.
2. Look for certain key words in the text that reveal the points at
which the strains of an attempt to sustain or impose logocentric conclusions
make themselves felt in the text. These are points of condensation, "where
a single term brings together different lines of argument or sets of values.' '"1
3. Pay attention to the marginal features of the text, such as the sorts
of metaphor that occur in it, because they are "clues to what is truly
important." ' "o
V. CONVENTIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
REGULATION OF SUBVERSIVE POLITICAL PARTIES
Political parties have existed in some form in all systems of government
that claim to be democratic. 8 The philosophy of democracy has always had
at its core a belief in the right of the entire community to share in the
direction of the state. Political parties have traditionally been the machinery
for attaining this diffusion of power in an orderly manner.82 Occasionally,
political parties are formed for the purpose of terminating the democratic
system within a society. The right of political parties to work toward the
displacement of the prevailing democratic system has tested the very premise
and foundational principles of democratic societies. Whether a democratic
system can consistently deny access to the democratic process to anti-dem-
ocratic political parties is the question underlying the paradox of freedom.83
Both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany recognize
the right to organize and operate political parties. Both countries have also
tried to limit this right. The West German Constitution (Grundgesetz) pre-
scribes that the internal organization of political parties must conform to
democratic principles.84 In the United States, the right to form, organize,
and operate political parties is not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution
79. Id. at 213.
80. Id. at 146, 215.
81. S. NEUMANN, MODERN POLITICAL PARTIES 1 (1956).
82. W. CROTTY, D. FREEMAN & P. GATLIN, POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 15
(1966).
83. For one articulation of the paradox of controlling dissent in a free society, see Devel-
opments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1130, 1135 (1972). See also K. POPPER, supra note 16, at 265 n.4. Compare 0. KIRCHHEIMER,
POLITICAL JUSTICE 119 (1961) (history illustrates futility of attempting to suppress subversive
groups while maintaining political liberties) with Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation
Against Political Freedom, 49 CAL. L. REV. 4, 10 (1961) (limiting subversive groups' civil
liberties to protect state is national imperative).
84. GRUNDGESETZ [G.G.] art. 21(l) (W. Ger.).
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but has been held to be an inherent right."' This inherent right is subject to
reasonable governmental regulation.
8 6
Subversive political parties have been subjected to adverse treatment by
legislative and judicial decision makers in both Germany and the United
States. In examining legal decisions against such groups, some writers have
maintained that the right of access to the ballot provides the "practical
extent to which the right to form a political party is subject to qualification
and limitation." 87 Analysis of the right of access to the ballot will thus be
central to this discussion. However, the manner in which a society's decision
makers deal with individuals who form and participate in subversive political
parties will also be considered. The right of an association to be on the
ballot may be of little value if sanctions imposed upon achieving the asso-
ciation's ends have undermined the incentive of individuals to participate in
the political process.
Government sanctions on individuals for membership in subversive polit-
ical parties have been manifested in numerous subtle ways. Clarity requires
that this article deal only with the most direct methods used. Nevertheless,
it must be kept in mind that governmental investigations that expose indi-
viduals to public harassment and employment disqualifications have also
played a major role in discouraging individuals from associating with sub-
versive political parties.
VI. CONTROL OF SUBVERSIVE POLITICAL
PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
The most recent congressional attack on the rights of subversive polit-
ical parties88 was the passage in 1954 of the Communist Control Act
85. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973) (freedom to associate for the
"common advancement of political beliefs" protected by first and fourteenth amendments).
86. For example, political primary elections may not be used to circumvent an individual's
right to vote under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73 (1932), or the fifteenth amendment, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The
Court held in both cases that Congress had power to regulate these primary elections. See also
Jennis v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (describing permissible ballot access regulations).
87. C. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 101-02 (1962).
88. The Constitution of the United States is silent about political parties. It neither provides
for their existence nor creates limitations on their formation or activity in any explicit way.
Political parties did not need authorization at the Philadelphia convention because they did not
function at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. I R. HARLOW, GROWTH OF THE
UNITED STATES 258, 259 (1943). By 1789, political parties had become an important part of
politics in the United States, and with the emerging importance of political parties came
regulation. J. CHARLES, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 9 (1956). The incumbent
Federalists were aggressively attacked by the Republicans who, it was thought, were supported
by a press controlled mainly by non-citizens. I T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1967). Spurred on by the threat of war with
France, Congress enacted legislation known as the Alien and Sedition Acts, which were aimed
at limiting political expression and abolishing the popular vote. An Act Concerning Aliens, ch.
58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired) (authorizing President to report "dangerous aliens"); An Act
Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, I Stat. 577 (1798) (expired) (allowing for deportation of
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(CCA). s 9 The CCA represents the culmination of a long struggle that
was manifested in two previous statutes known as the Smith Act,"" passed
in 1940, and the Internal Security Act (ISA), 9' passed in 1950. These
three pieces of legislation, along with the judicial opinions they have
evoked, comprise the present body of law on subversive political associ-
ation imposed by the United States government.
The Smith Act made criminal those who organized groups with the anti-
democratic idea that the United States government should be replaced by
violent means rather than by the ballot.92 The Smith Act was invoked only
three times from 1940 to 1950. It was first used against eighteen members
of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in 1941. The conviction of the SWP
members was sustained by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit93
under the broad doctrine that a legislature is entitled to extinguish a revo-
lutionary spark before it becomes a conflagration.94 This test greatly restricted
free political expression by allowing the prohibition of any "expression which
had a tendency, or which the legislature could reasonably believe had a
.certain aliens); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired) (recognizing opposition to
government measures and libel against U.S. government).
The Alien and Sedition Acts did not directly attack the right of political association, but
rather the right of individual political expression. The early Federalists attempted more direct
suppression of political opposition. As soon as free elections no longer supported the policies
of Hamilton's Federalists, they tried to abolish the popular vote. The Federalists were almost
successful in their attempts to destroy the Republican opposition. See A. JOHNSON, UNION AND
DEMOCRACY 119 (1915).
The process that culminated in the Alien and Sedition Acts included a good deal of debate
between the Federalists and the Republicans. Those favoring the legislation maintained that the
exercise of federal power was derived from the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution
and that Congress was not exceeding its powers, since the first amendment prohibited only
prior censorship. T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN, supra, at 38. The public was apparently
outraged by this legislation. For example, Kentucky passed a resolution in 1789 stating that:
"it would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the men of our choice to silence our
fears for the safety of our rights." United States Department of State, HUMAN RIGHTS,
UNFOLDING OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION 25 (1949) (quoting from H. COMMANGER, DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 181 (4th ed. 1948)). As a result, the Republicans were voted into power
and the Federalists were destroyed as a political party.
89. 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-44 (1982).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982).
91. 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-94, 811-26 (1982).
92. The relevant provisions of the Smith Act impose penalties against:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly
of persons who teach, advocate or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any
such government [government of the United States, or the government of any state,
territory, District or Possession thereof, or of any political subdivision therein] by
force or violence, or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with any such society,
group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purpose thereof ....
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982). Penalties were also to be imposed "if two or more persons conspire
to commit any offense named in this section .... Id.
93. Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943).
94. 138 F.2d at 145. The Dunne court relied on Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Gitlow stated that "[a] single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a
time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration." Id. at 669.
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tendency, to lead to substantive evil," 5 such as violent overthrow of the
government.
The third 6 and most important use of the Smith Act occurred in 1948,
when the federal government indicted and convicted twelve members of the
central committee of the Communist Party of the United States of America
(CPUSA) for violating section three of the Smith Act.' 7 The convictions
were affirmed by the Second Circuit in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand"
and ultimately by the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion, Dennis v. United
States,"" written by Chief Justice Vinson.
The Dennis plurality held that the limit of tolerance of a subversive party
is to be determined by the clear and present danger test,"' ) as explained by
Judge Hand in the lower court opinion."' Under the clear and present danger
test, the question is "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger.""'2 In applying this test to the Dennis case, Chief Justice Vinson
concluded for the plurality that a sufficient danger existed from a continuing
95. T. EMERSON, ToWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 50 (1966). Prior
to Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), speech advocating an illegal act was punishable
as an "attempt" if the natural and reasonable tendency of what was said would be to bring
about a forbidden effect. For the development of Holmes' clear and present danger test from
Schenck through Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 12-9, at 608-14 (1978).
96. The second use of the Smith Act was not directly relevant to the control of political
parties. It involved the indictment in 1942 of 28 alleged pro-Nazis for conspiracy to violate
sections of the Smith Act dealing with impairing the morale of the armed forces. L. TRIBE,
supra note 95, at 610.
97. United States v. Dennis, 72 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1948). The indictment in the Dennis
case charged the defendants with wilfully and knowingly conspiring to organize the CPUSA, a
group of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government
of the United States by force and violence and to knowingly and wilfully advocate and teach
the duty and necessity of overthrowing the government. Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201,
205-06 (2d Cir. 1950).
The prosecution's evidence showed the formation of a disciplined party organization that
systematically taught revolutionary doctrines as formulated in standard Communist textbooks.
Although there was apparently no immediate attempt to overthrow the existing United States
government, the CPUSA was alleged to be ready to act at once to seize power whenever
circumstances should become favorable. A jury found that the defendants were in violation of
the Smith Act because they were unwilling to work within the "framework of democracy but
intended to initiate a violent revolution whenever the propitious occasion appeared." Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951).
98. Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
99. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
100. Justice Holmes first developed the clear and present danger test in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 52 (quoted
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1951)).
101. 341 U.S. at 510.
102. Id. (quoting Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212).
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conspiracy by the Communist Party that criminal sanctions against its mem-
bers were justified." 3
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred separately in the result, al-
though they disagreed with the plurality's use of the clear and present danger
test."' 4 Like the plurality, however, the concurrence took judicial notice of
the conspiratorial nature of the CPUSA.' °5 All of the non-dissenting Justices
appeared to agree on one essential and novel conclusion-that Congress had
the power to strike out at the CPUSA as an association because its goal was
the violent overthrow of the government. Justice Frankfurter, for example,
stated that the government's right to self-preservation is the most pervasive
aspect of sovereignty and that the balance between these principles, though
subject to first amendment limitations, should be set by Congress."'"
By characterizing the Communist Party as illegal, the Dennis Court seemed
to conclude that present and knowing membership in the CPUSA implied
compatability with its illegal aims and methods. The immediate result of the
Dennis case was to find members of the CPUSA guilty under the Smith Act,
but the Court's implication that the CPUSA might be illegal per se had a
greater implication for later legislation and judicial decisions.
The Supreme Court handed down its crucial decision in the Dennis case
in 1951. Before the decision, however, Congress reached the conclusion that
the Smith Act was not sufficient to protect national security from what was
believed to be a growing Communist threat. Congress therefore enacted,
over President Truman's veto," 7 the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1950,
which provided a system of registration for organizations found to be
subversive by the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB)." 5
103. 341 U.S. at 498. In assessing the danger that the defendants represented, both the court
of appeals and the Supreme Court reviewed and adopted the findings of the district court about
the nature of the CPUSA:
that the Communist Party is a highly disciplined organization, adept at infiltrating
into strategic positions, use of aliases, and double-meaning language; that the Party
is rigidly controlled; that Communists, unlike other political parties, tolerate no
dissension from the policy laid down by the guiding forces, but that the approved
program is slavishly followed by the members of the Party; that the literature of
the Party and the statements and activities of its leaders, petitioners here, advocate,
and the general goal of the party was, during the period in question, to achieve a
successful overthrow of the existing order by force and violence.
Id.
104. Id at 548-49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 568-69 (Jackson, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 562-66 (Jackson, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 546-52 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Of the dissenters, Justice Black argued that
first amendment liberties should be given the highest priority, id. at 580 (Black, J., dissenting),
and Justice Douglas recognized no right in the government to curtail speech until "the pro-
vocateurs among us move from speech to action." Id. at 591 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
107. 96 CONG. REC. 15629-32 (1950) (text of President's veto message).
108. The ISA incorporated important legislative findings as to the nature of the CPUSA. It
said of the CPUSA that:
although such organizations usually designate themselves as political parties, they
are in fact constituted elements of the world wide communist movement and promote
the objectives of such movement by conspiratorial and co-ercive tactics, instead of
19851
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On November 22, 1950, using his powers under the ISA, the Attorney
General filed a petition with the Subversive Activities Control Board for an
order compelling the CPUSA to register as a Communist action organization"',
and to give the names and addresses of individuals who had been members
in the last twelve months.'" If the CPUSA failed to register, the ISA provided
that individual members must register. After prolonged legal battle, the
SACB found the CPUSA to be a Communist action organization and ordered
it to register.' The SACB's action was taken in 1953 and, ultimately, the
matter was submitted to the Supreme Court. Eight years later, the Supreme
Court ordered the CPUSA to register in Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Board."12 In the eleven years after the passage of the ISA,
much had happened both legislatively and judicially to change the practical
effect of this decision.
In 1954, national feeling against Communism in the wake of the Korean
War found the United States Congress once again anxious to proscribe the
activities of the CPUSA. In an attempt to express this national attitude, as
well as to assure others that he was not himself a Communist," 3 Senator
Hubert Humphrey proposed the outlawing of the CPUSA and the punish-
ment of its members. Critics of this proposal argued that such legislation
would make the provision of the ISA ineffective, since parties ordered to
register could argue that forced registration would violate their right against
self-incrimination." 4 Congress finally determined not to outlaw the CPUSA
but passed numerous acts against subversive activities and organizations,
including the Communist Control Act." 5 The CCA took its lead from the
Dennis case, which arguably recognized the power of the Congress to find
the CPUSA an illegal organization." 6 Nevertheless, Congress did not outlaw
the CPUSA. Although many sections of the CCA are directed specifically
against the CPUSA and its members," 7 the legislative history of the CCA
indicates that the primary purpose of Congress was to restrict the right of
CPUSA candidates to appear on the ballot. '" The CCA divests the CPUSA,
through the democratic process of a free elective system or through the freedom of
preserving means employed by a political party which operates as an agency by
which people govern themselves.
ISA § 2(6), 50 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1982).
109. New York Times, Nov. 23, 1950, at I, col. 2.
110. See 28 C.F.R. § 11.1-.400 (1950).
I1l. See T. EMERSON, supra note 95, at 200.
112. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
113. 100 CONG. REC. 14,208 (1954) (Sen. Humphrey's miea culpa).
114. Id. at 14,223.
115. Note, Federal Anti-Subversive Legislation of 1954, 55 COLUM. L. RiEv. 631 (1955).
116. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 501.
117. See CCA § 2, 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1982) (finding CPUSA a conspiratorial instrumentality
for overthrow of United States government); id. § 3, 50 U.S.C. § 842 (lifting rights, privileges,
and immunities of CPUSA as a legal body); id. § 4, 50 U.S.C. § 843 (proscribing membership
in CPUSA).
118. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1959: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of
Free Speech, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 173, 175 (1956). Section 2 states, in words similar to those
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and any other organization that has the object of overthrowing the govern-
ment of the United States by force or violence, of its rights under state or
federal law.' 9
By 1954, the United States found itself with three major pieces of legis-
lation regarding subversive political organization and membership: the Smith
Act, the Internal Security Act and the Communist Control Act. This was
the high water mark of federal anti-Communist activity. In 1956, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in various Smith Act convictions. 21 Its decision on
the first of these cases, Yates v. United States, 121 was rendered the next year.
used in the Dennis case:
The Congress finds and declares that the Communist Party of the United States,
although purportedly a political party is in fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy
to overthrow the Government of the United States .... The peril inherent in its
operation arises not from its numbers, but from its very failure to acknowledge
any limitation as to the nature of its activities and its dedication to the proposition
that the present constitutional government of the United States ultimately must be
brought to ruin by any available means, including resort to force and violence.
Holding that doctrine, its role as the agency of a hostile foreign power renders its
existence a clear and present and continuing danger to the security of the United
States .... Therefore the Communist Party of the United States should be out-
lawed.
CCA § 2, 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1982); see Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509.
119. Auerbach, supra note 118, at 176. In order to carry out this aim, § 3 of the CCA was
constructed as follows:
The Communist Party of the United States, or any successors of such party
regardless of the assumed name, whose object or purpose is to overthrow the
Government of the United States; or the government of any State, Territory, District
or Possession thereof; or the government of any political subdivision therein by
force and violence are not entitled to any of the rights, privileges and immunities
attendant upon legal bodies . . . and whatever rights, privileges and immunities
which have heretofore been granted to said party . . . by reason of the laws of the
United States or any political subdivision thereof, are terminated: Provided, how-
ever, That nothing in this section shall be construed as amending the Internal
Security Act of 1950, as amended.
CCA § 3, 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1982). Section 4 of the CCA applied to individuals who:
knowingly and willfully become or remain a member of (1) the Communist Party,
or (2) any other organization having for one of its purposes or objectives the
establishment, control, conduct, seizure or overthrow of the government of the
United States or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof, by
the use of force or violence, with knowledge of the purpose or objective of such
organization ....
CCA § 4, 50 U.S.C. § 843 (1982). But see Auerbach, supra note 118, at 174-77 (arguing that,
because CPUSA was not incorporated, it "never had the rights the [CCAI attempts to take
away").
120. Comment, Communist Control Act of 1954, 64 YALE L. J. 712, 747 (1955).
121. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Prior to Yates, the Department of Justice commenced a series of
prosecutions, mostly of the CPUSA's state leaders and secondary national officials. Fifteen
prosecutions involving 121 defendants were brought under conspiracy sections, and eight
individual prosecutions were brought under the membership provisions. By June, 1957, the
government had secured convictions of 96 defendants in addition to the II Dennis defendants.
I N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
114 (4th ed. 1976). In the first two post-Dennis prosecutions to reach the Court of Appeals,
conspiracy convictions were affirmed. Frankfeld v. United States, 198 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953); United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955),
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The government argued in Yates that active membership in the CPUSA
implied compatibility with its illegal goals and methods. 2 The Court accepted
the argument that active membership in the CPUSA was enough to make
an individual inferentially a party to its beliefs, but the Court refused to
agree that the CPUSA's goals were necessarily illegal. 21 The Court insisted
that evidence must be shown that the CPUSA's actions or goals are illegal.
Thus, the Smith Act prohibits advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow
only when combined with an effort to instigate action to that end. It does
not prohibit advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract
principle. 124
Two weeks before the Yates decision the Supreme Court decided Jencks
v. United States. 21 In Jencks, the defendant had been charged with falsely
swearing that he was not a member of the Communist Party. Jencks held
that the defendant had a right to inspect and use on cross-examination
reports and statements made by prosecution witnesses to the FBI pertaining
to matters about which the witnesses had testified at trial. ='2 The Yates and
Jencks decisions had a great effect upon the use of the Smith Act. No
further prosecutions were brought, and all cases except Scales v. United
States 27 were ultimately dismissed by the court or dropped by the govern-
ment. 21
122. Yates, 354 U.S. at 313.
123. The Yates Court first held that the term "organize" as used in the Smith Act "refers
only to acts entering into the creation of a new organization and not to acts thereafter performed
in carrying ol its activities." The CPUSA was originally founded in 1919. In 1944, it became
the Communist Political Association and in 1945, the Association was disbanded and reconsti-
tuted as the Communist Party. The organizing count of the indictment was therefore barred
by the three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 303-12.
In 1962, Congress, in reaction to the Yates decision, added to the Smith Act that "the terms
'organizes' and 'organize' . . . include the recruiting of new members, the forming of new
units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes and other units. 18
U.S.C. § 2385 (1982).
124. The Yates Court held that, even if the defendants were actively participating in the
CPUSA, it must be shown that the CPUSA is engaged in something more than the abstract
advocacy and teaching of forceable overthrow in order that the "specific" intent to accomplish
such overthrow could be deemed proved by a showing of mere membership or holding office
in the Communist party. 354 U.S. at 318-27.
The majority decision also said, in dicta, that attendance by some of the defendants at lawful
and orderly meetings of the CPUSA at which unlawful advocacy was undertaken might be a
sufficient "overt act" to warrant a conspiracy conviction. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Black raised the problem of freedom of association, noting the apparent contradiction between
a ruling that would attach a species of criminal liability to mere attendance at a lawful meeting
and the Court's previous rulings on freedom of association. Justice Black referred to the
decision of DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), which held that the right of the CPUSA
to engage in peaceful assembly and lawful discussion could not be abridged despite the fact
that the general objective of the CPUSA was to overthrow the government by force. Yates,
354 U.S. at 343 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
125. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
126. Id. at 658-59, 672.
127. 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (membership of one who has knowledge of organization's specific
intent to violently overthrow government constitutes sufficient relationship to organization's
criminal activity).
128. 1 T. EMERSON, 1). HABER & N. DORSEN, supra note 88, at 140.
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The Supreme Court found against the defendant in Scales under the
membership clause of the Smith Act on the same day that it found in favor
of the defendant in Noto v. United States'29 on a similar charge. These two
decisions show the Supreme Court's recognition that political parties might
embrace both legal and illegal aims, and that a "blanket prohibition of
association with a group having both legal and illegal aims ... would indeed
be a real danger [to] legitimate political expression [and] association."13" So,
when both legal and illegal aims occur simultaneously, the government could
proscribe the latter, leaving the former entitled to constitutional protection
unless the legal aims were so inseparable from the illegal that they too must
fall. The problem of proof in such cases has been properly called "formi-
dable."'' If it is shown that the party has illegal aims only, or that its illegal
aims are inseparable from its legal ones, membership alone can not result
in criminal sanctions under the Smith Act. It is still necessary that the
government present clear proof that the defendant specifically intended to
accomplish the aims of the organization by resorting to violence.
As a result of the judicial decisions flowing from the Smith Act, there is
no constitutional freedom of subversive activity. That is, one cannot associate
with others to instigate the violent overthrow of the present government of
the United States. The Supreme Court, however, has avoided the implication
of the Dennis case that mere membership in the CPUSA is illegal. The Court
has instead decided to grant constitutional protection to certain political
parties or groups and not to others, depending on the facts rather than on
whether the group is called Communist or merely holds anti-democratic
ideas. If the Court decides that the group is acceptable, then its members
are protected. Even if the group is unacceptable on the facts, i.e., if it is
instigating violent overthrow, only a member with the requisite knowledge
and intent is not constitutionally protected.
As previously discussed, the breadth of the Smith Act was cut by the
Yates and Jencks decisions of 1957. The government's anti-subversive arse-
nal, however, still contained the ISA and the CCA. On December 1, 1961,
a federal grand jury indicted the CPUSA for failure to register under the
ISA.'1 2 The CPUSA was convicted and the trial court imposed a fine of
$120,000. The court of appeals, however, reversed the trial court on self-
incrimination grounds, holding that prosecution under the Smith Act is a
sufficient threat of self incrimination such that an individual may not be
forced to register as a party member.' 3 The government's petition for
certiorari was denied.' 34
129. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
130. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961).
131. C. RICE, supra note 87, at 145.
132. We have covered the events relating to the ISA up to 1953 when the SACB ordered the
CPUSA to register. By 1961, the CPUSA's contention that it need not register was heard by
the Supreme Court in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
A decision was rendered in favor of the government, making the SACB order to register
effective within 30 days. The CPUSA refused to register, giving as its grounds the fear of self-
incrimination. Id. at 105-06.
133. Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
134. 377 U.S. 968 (1964).
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The Department of Justice also prosecuted individual officers of the
CPUSA for failure to register. All these actions, however, were eventually
dismissed on self-incrimination grounds.' 5 By 1961, even though the Yates
and Jencks decisions had effectively prevented the Government from using
the Smith Act, the possibility of prosecution under the Smith Act was enough
to preclude convictions under the ISA.
Because of the restrictive federal legislation reviewed above, as well as
state restrictions on access to the ballot, the CPUSA did not run a presidential
ticket from 1940 to 1968. The CPUSA, however, appears to have abandoned
its commitment to revolution. It has declared that it believes in government
coming to power by popular election,'16 but that it is still "a revolutionary
party whose aim is the fundamental tranformation of society."' 37 Where
state restrictions on access to the ballot have been removed, the CPUSA has
run a national ticket every four years since 1968. Although estimates vary
on the strength of the CPUSA, the actual influence of the party in United
States politics is minimal.' 38
135. T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, supra note 88, at 191.
136. New York Times, Apr. 20, 1968, L 15 at 4 (announcing CPUSA's plan to run national
candidates). According to Gus Hall, the CPUSA intended to run candidates in presidential
elections after 1968. In anticipation of this move, the CPUSA effected a startling metamorphosis.
137. PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A. (A Draft) 97 (1966). In its platform, the
CPUSA appeared to abandon its commitment to revolution.
We believe that such a government [Communist] can be brought to power by
democratic means. More, we believe that democratic means are not only desirable,
they are indispensible .... [lit strikes us as folly to think that monopoly can be
overcome by a revolutionary transformation of society .... We believe this dem-
ocratic transformation can be effected through the Constitutional powers and
Constitutionally established institutions.
Id.
138. The party's peak was in 1932 when it received .03% of the popular vote. In 1968 and
1972 its presidential candidates each received less than .01% of the popular vote. CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 178 (1976). In 1976, the CPUSA's presidential ticket of
Gus Hall and Jarvis Tyner was on the ballot in 19 states and the District of Columbia. It
received 59,000 votes. The party's gubernatorial candidate in New York received 11,279 votes.
Gus Hall claimed in 1980 that the party had 15,000 to 20,000 members, while a party
spokesperson claimed 30,000 to 80,000 members. HOOVER INSTITUTE, Y.B. ON INTERNAT'L
COMMUNIST AFFAIRS 393 (1980). Gus Hall and Angela Davis headed the 1980 ticket and received
a total of 45,023 votes. At present the CPUSA has no representation either in Congress or in
any state legislature. 14 AMERICA VOTES 18 (Scammon & McGillivray eds. 1980).
If the CPUSA should now have its place on the ballot for national elections challenged,
could § 3 of the CCA deprive it of this lawful activity? Two approaches are possible. A court
may refuse to hear evidence of the CPUSA's change of position, or it may simply not believe
the CPUSA's declaration. There is precedent for the latter. At its convention in 1940, the
CPUSA resolved "That the Communist Party of the U.S.A. in convention assembled does
hereby cancel and dissolve its organizational affiliation to the Communist International ...
for the specific purpose of removing itself from the terms of the so-called Voorhis Act."
Internal Security Subcommittee, Senate Committee on the Judiciary Reporl, The Communist
Party of the U.S.A., 2 (84 Cong. 2nd Sess. 1955). The Voorhis Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (1982),
requires registration of certain political organizations.
The SACB viewed this as merely a tactic that did not alter the foreign domination of the
CPUSA. Id. In the same manner, a court might simply not believe that the CPUSA now
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In the foregoing analysis, the goals, activities, and ideas of the CPUSA
and the legislation and judicial decisions fashioned to regulate them have
advocates peaceful change and, thus, would not extend first amendment protection. If this
occurs, grave implications will be raised about the ability of government to restrict freedom of
speech-at least political speech. The government would be saying, in effect, "We know what
you really mean and since what you covertly intend is illegal we will deny your right to say
anything."
The other approach available to a court is simply to accept the legislative findings in the
CCA and not take further evidence. Although the Supreme Court in Yates and Noto held that
facts must be shown of illegal activity by the CPUSA, there is some question whether courts
will review the congressional findings and declarations in § 2 of the CCA. The New York Court
of Appeals, in reviewing the CCA, referred to the congressional finding that the CPUSA is an
instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States. The court
concluded that "these facts are so well established and known that recognition of them without
further proof is a right and duty." In re Albertson's Claim, 8 N.Y.2d 77, 85, 168 N.E.2d 242,
244-45 (1960). The court of appeals thereby denied unemployment compensation to an ex-
employee of the CPUSA.
The employee appealed to the United States Supreme Court, raising the constitutional issue
of whether the CCA was a bill of attainder or ex post facto legislation. The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court but avoided constitutional issues by saying only that "rights, privileges
and immunities" as used in § 3 of the CCA, although vague, was not meant to require exclusion
of the employee from New York's unemployment compensation system. Communist Party,
U.S.A. v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389, 390 (1961). When the case was returned to the New
York Court of Appeals, a motion was granted to amend the remittitur by adding a statement
that § 3 of the CCA was constitutional and was not a bill of attainder or ex post facto law.
Nor did it violate the first or fourteenth amendments. Moreover, § 3 was within the power of
Congress to enact. In re Albertson's Claim, 8 N.Y.2d 1001, 1001, 169 N.E.2d 427, 428 (1960).
The constitutional problems purportedly solved by the above case do not sufficiently answer
the important constitutional problem of whether the CCA, by citing the CPUSA, is a bill of
attainder. The bill of attainder issue is dependent on how the courts interpret Congress's
determinations about the nature of the CPUSA. This issue has been raised in the context of
the separation of federal and state power over elections. Congress has the authority to regulate
election for the offices of Senator and Representative. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (states
choose time, place and manner of holding elections for members of Congress). But article 1,
§ 4 also empowers Congress to alter such state regulations. id. Section five of the fourteenth
amendment confers other powers on Congress to regulate state elections. See Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Congress may ban literacy tests in state elections); see also White v.
Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (if state adopts electoral system to fill state posts, equal protection
clause confers upon all qualified voters a right to participate equally in electoral process).
The only case somewhat on point arose when a county clerk in New Jersey declined to place
Communist candidates on a ballot for local public office. The clerk based his action on the
CCA. The New Jersey Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff's action to get on the ballot and
the state supreme court unanimously affirmed. Salwen v. Rees, 16 N.J. 216, 108 A.2d 265
(1954) (per curiam). The appellant argued that the CCA has to do with the Communist Party
as such and not with any individual person. He maintained that the CPUSA, as such, was
therefore not appearing on the ballot. It is difficult to determine whether the court's decision
supports the application of the CCA or merely considers the appellant not a proper party in
interest. At one point, the court said that the CCA is directed at the CPUSA, suggesting that
the individual candidate need only cease to use the CPUSA label to escape the CCA's effect.
Id. at 217, 108 A.2d at 265.
It is also arguable that the Salwen court based its decision on the premise that Congress has
not overstepped its power to regulate local elections. The court answered the plaintiff's allegation
that the CCA is an unconstitutional amending of the qualification for local public office by
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tested such concepts as ex post facto, bill of attainder, due process and
equal protection. However, the most important concepts that have been
applied to this problem are the justifiable limitations on basic principles of
freedom of speech and freedom of association. The Supreme Court has
developed a ruling principle that these freedoms are subordinate to the right
of government to self protection. Although this priority of principles has
been called a necessary part of sovereignty,' 3 9 we will now see that West
Germany has constructed a different heirarchy.
VII. THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE WITH SUBVERSIVE POLITICAL PARTIES
The drafters of the Bonn Constitution concluded, perhaps wrongly, that
the catastrophic events that led Germany into and through Nazism were
caused by the Weimer Republic's indifference to the goals of political
parties. 1'4 So that history would not repeat itself, the drafters vowed the
creation of a "valiant democracy." The state was not to be neutral towards
political parties. 141
saying:
[[If tile larger objective requires in individual instances ... that there be a pertinent
restriction upon access to public office, then such restriction must be supported.
And if, in order to make good the outlawry of the Communist Party as such, it
becomes unavoidable that individuals be prevented from carrying its banner, so to
speak, well, that course will have to be taken in tile administration of the law.
Id. at 218, 108 A.2d at 266.
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision appears to have missed most of the issues raised by
the CCA cases. It finally arrived at the conclusion that the CCA was meant to outlaw the
CPUSA. Section 3 of the CCA may have been meant to keep the CPUSA from the ballot, but
it is too simple to conclude that § 3 was meant to make the CPUSA's existence unlawful.
Indeed, § 3 expressly states that it shall not be construed as amending the ISA. CCA § 3, 50
U.S.C. § 842 (1982). The information required for registration under the ISA assumes a degree
of activity-for example, that the party will continue to have offices, officers, and members;
to collect and spend money; to make and keep records; and that it will pay income tax and
engage in radio and television broadcasts. All of these activities, as well as the fact that Senator
Humphrey's original proposal to outlaw the CPUSA was rejected, show that Congress did not
intend complete prohibition.
Many of the inconsistencies and uncertainties of state laws against subversive political parties
were resolved by a 1951 Supreme Court decision holding that the Smith Act preempted the
area of sedition against the United States. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1951). Under
this decision, the Michigan Supreme Court declared that a state statute providing that no
Communist name may be printed on the ballot was included among those provisions pre-empted
by the federal legislation. Albertson v. Millard, 345 Mich. 519, 77 N.W.2d 104 (1956).
139. Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CAL. L.
REV. 4, 10 (1961).
140. The argument against this view is strong. The Weimer Republic possessed constitutional
and statutory power to act against parties hostile to the Weimer government and the values it
represented. GRUNDGEsETZ [GGI art. 48(2) (W. Ger. 1919) and Law for the Protection of the
Republic of July 21, 1922, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 585, amended by Act of June 2, 1927,
RGBI 125 (W. Ger.). See Mauer, Das Verbot Politischer Parteien: Zur Problemnatik des Art
21, Abs. 2 G.G., 96 ARcnttv DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 203, 206 (1971) (between 1922 and
1929, in Prussia alone, nearly 30 political parties and groups were disbanded).
141. McWhinney, The German Constitutional Court and the Communist Party Decision, 32
IND. L.J. 295 (1957).
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While this constitution, the Basic Law of The Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG), permits the free formation of political parties,142 it also declares in
article 21(2) that "Parties which, according to their aims and the behavior
of their members, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order
or to jeopardize the existence of the FRG, shall be unconstitutional."' 4 3 The
Basic Law assigns to the constitutional court the power to decide whether a
political party is contrary to the Basic Law.'44
In late 1951, the FRG's federal government, by motion, requested a
determination by the federal Constitutional Court that the West German
Communist Party (KPD) was unconstitutional under article 21(2). This
motion reached the court a week later accompanied by an identical govern-
ment motion against the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), an extreme right wing
neo-Nazi party. Almost a year later, the court declared the SRP to be
unconstitutional. 45 In 1956, the court made a similar finding about the
KPD.1
46
142. GG art. 21(l).
143. GG art. 21(2). Political parties, as used in Article 21, was defined by the Political
Parties Act of June 24, 1967, as:
organizations of citizens exercising influence throughout the Federation or a state
on the formation of the political will, and seeking to participate in popular repre-
sentation in either the Bundestag or a state assembly. The organization must be
able to demonstrate that the pursuit of such a goal is not without seriousness of
purpose. Such a demonstration may be made from the totality of the parties'
circumstances, especially the breadth and stability of the party organization, the
number of party members and the extent of the members entering into public life.
1967 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 1 773, § 2(l)(1) (W. Ger.)
144. GG art. 93; see also F. CASTBERG, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE WEST 378-83 (1960).
145. Decision of October 23, 1952, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BVerfG I (W. Get.) [here-
inafter cited as SRP Decision].
146. Decision of August 17, 1956, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 5 BVerfG 85 (W. Ger.) [here-
inafter cited as KPD Decision].
The KPD then sought help from the European Commission of Human Rights, asserting that
the FRG's dissolution of the KPD violated the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, to which the Federal Republic of Germany is a signatory. This
convention, commonly known as the European Convention on Human Rights, states in Article
II that:
(I) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for
the protection of his interests.
(2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State.
European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art 11, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 232.
Article 17, however, provides that "[nlothing in this Convention may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein ..... Id., art. 17,
at 234. The Commission held that the KPD's complaint was inadmissible based on article 17.
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At the time of these decisions, the bench of the court was, in the tradition
of continental courts, anonymous. Its members were not well known to the
general public. It delivered only single, per curiam opinions in each case
with no publication of actual voting by the judges and no concurring or
dissenting opinions being permitted.' 47 The court's opinions in the SRP and
KPD cases were lengthy and carefully analyzed the position of subversive
political parties in West Germany. 141
The evidence clearly indicated that the SRP was a Nazi-front organiza-
tion. 1 49 The SRP argued, however, that it was not contrary to the free
democratic order since it received popular support and power democratically.
The court held that the activities of the SRP showed it to be contrary to
the character of the free democratic order and thus lacking in the prerequisites
necessary for "a party's participation in the formation of the political
will." '5
In the Communist Party case, the KPD defended with the assertion that
article 21(2) was itself inconsistent with constitutional norms because it stood
in the way of the more basic norms of reunification, free speech and free
association. The KPD also argued that the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the
Decision of July 20, 1957, 1955-57 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGITs 222, 225 (Eur. Comm'n
on Human Rights). In applying Article 17, the Commission would not recognize a difference
between short term legal aims and ultimate objectives of the KPD. Id.
This decision was discussed by the European Court of Human Rights in a 1961 case
interpreting Article 17. The court said that:
the general purpose of Article 17 is to prevent totalitarian groups from exploiting
in their own interest the principles enunciated by the Convention; but that to achieve
that purpose it is not necessary to take away every one of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed in the Convention from persons found to be engaged in activities aimed
at the destruction of any of those rights and freedoms; that Article 17 covers
essentially those rights which, if invoked, would facilitate the attempt to derive
therefrom a right to engage personally in activities aimed at the destruction of "any
of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention"; that the decision on the
admissibility of the Application submitted by the German Communist Party (Ap-
plication No. 250/57) was perfectly consistent with this construction of Article 17;
* . . those rights, if extended to the Communist Party, would have enabled it to
engage in the very activities referred to in Article 17 ....
Lawless Case, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438, 450 (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights) (merits).
147. This traditional continental approach was criticized in the 1960's. Heidenhain, Der 47.
Deutsche Juristentag, 23 JURISTENZEITUNG 755, 757 (1968). The criticism resulted in a statutory
change amending § 30 of the Law Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichtsgesetz) as amended in 1971. Now decisions, if they are not unanimous, state how
many judges voted for and against a position. Dissenting opinions are published with the
majority opinion, and judges joining in the dissenting opinion are named. See R. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 14, at 420.
148. For an English translation of the KPD decisions, see OUTLAWING THE COMMUNIST PARTY
(W. von Schmertzing trans. & ed. 1957).
149. Franz, Unconstitutional and Outlawed Political Parties: A German-American Compar-
ison, 5 B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 51, 56 (1982). Evidence summarized in the court's opinion
included correspondence between SRP members in which they referred to each other as "old
warriors" who were "still loyal to the cause." Id.
150. SRP Decision, 2 BVerfG at 73.
DECONSTR UCTING PRINCIPLES
party is a science and therefore not subject to court review. 5' Although the
German Constitutional Court has recognized in the past the possibility of
an "unconstitutional constitutional norm," it has allowed for this possibility
"only if the norm is contradictory to a fundamental constitutional principle
by which the individual positive provisions of the Constitution can and must
be measured." '52 The fundamental principles the court referred to, though
not stated in the FRG's Constitution,' 51 were first developed in the SRP
decision. They are based on human dignity and, thus, are applicable even
though they might not now win popular support. 5 4 The court defined these
principles as follows:
The fundamental free democratic order is an order which, to the exclusion
of all rule of force or arbitrariness, implies an order of government with
rule of law based on the self determination of the people in accordance
with the will of the current majority and based on freedom and equality.
Accordingly, the fundamental principles of this order must at least include:
respect for the human rights formulated in the Constitution, above all the
right of the individual to life and free development, the sovereignty of the
people, the separation of powers, the accountability of the government,
the legality of administration, the independence of the judiciary, the
principle of several parties and equality of opportunity for all political
parties, and the right of constitutional creation and exercise of an oppo-
sition.'
The KPD's argument that the constitutional goals of free speech, associ-
ation, and national reunification should prevail over norms which might lead
to political party suppression was rejected by the court. The court held that
"there can be no thought of a formally higher rank for either."' 56 But, as
one commentator has stated, "despite language to the contrary, the court
ranked protection of the liberal democratic order and thus the suppression
of subversive political parties above both reunification and free expression
of political opinion." 157
The KPD's defense that its Marxist-Leninist doctrine was scientific and
thus beyond judicial review was also rejected. The court stated that it was
not outlawing ideas but merely ruling on the constitutional status of a
political party that is a constitutional institution. 5 ' The loss of that status,
rather than the legality of ideas, was at issue.
151. KPD Decision, 5 BVerfG at 105.
152. Id. at 137. This idea of supra-constitutional norms has been identified with natural law
concepts. Dietze, Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? Constitutional Development in Post-
war Germany, 42 VA. L. REV. 1 (1956); Von Hippel, The Role of National Law in the Legal
Decisions of the German Federal Republic, 4 NAT. L.F. 106, 112 (1959); see also Hahn, Trends
in the Jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 26 AM. J. COMp. L. 631,
637 (1978).
153. These characteristics of the free democratic order were announced without any authority
or rationale. H. GOERLICH, WERTORDNUNG UND GRUNDGESETZ 33-44 (1973).
154. KPD Decision, 5 BVerfG at 139.
155. SRP Decision, 2 BVerfG at 12-13.
156. KPD Decision, 5 BVerfG at 1373.
157. See Franz, supra note 149, at 62.
158. KPD Decision, 5 BVerfG at 1373.
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The court received a considerable amount of oral and written evidence on
the nature of the KPD. After viewing the KPD's history and teaching, the
court declared that the goal of the KPD was the establishment of the
Communist social order and dictatorship of the proletariat through a pro-
letarian revolution. The proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the
proletariat were held by the court to be incompatible with the free democratic
order. "'
The KPD argued that inchoate intentions were not enough to violate article
21(2). They contended that there must be a showing of overt acts such as
an undertaking to commit an act of high treason-something like the clear
and present danger test. The court disagreed with this argument and held
that, although the KPD goals were not immediately realizable, their long
range goals made it clear that the party intended presently to undermine the
free democratic order. The court concluded that the political fate of the
KPD was to be determined by its present intention, because the goal of
article 21(2) was to prevent the rise of political parties with anti-democratic
objectives. '6(3
On the basis of its conclusions, the Constitutional Court decreed that the
KPD was unconstitutional and was therefore dissolved. Moreover, the cre-
ation of a "front" or substitute organization for the KPD or the continuation
of existing organizations as "fronts" was prohibited. The property and
wealth of the KPD was declared to be confiscated by the government.'" A
further consequence of the decision was that KPD representatives in federal
and state lawmaking bodies lost their mandates.
62
In arriving at its decision, the court made it clear that the Bonn Consti-
tution is based on different premises than that of the Weimer Republic. The
court stressed that, given a multitude of goals and opinions that have taken
shape in the form of political parties, the Bonn Constitution selected certain
fundamental principles of policy. The principles, once recognized in a dem-
ocratic way, were to be acknowledged as absolute and, thus, protected by
the state."'3
Today in West Germany it is not a crime to be a communist. This is
permitted under the constitutional guarantee of free speech.' 4 It is forbidden,
however, to organize, support, or make propaganda for the Communist
Party. 6 ' This is because decisions of the Constitutional Court under article
159. Id. at 142.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 85-86.
162. McWhinney, supra note 141, at 304 n.16.
163. OUTLAWING TlE COMMUNIST PARTY, supra note 148, at 13.
164. GG art. 5. But see GG art. 17 (limitations).
165. Adam, West Germany's Political Trials, 75 NEW STATESMAN 29, 34 (1968) (prosecution
has been vigorous and has led to thousands of convictions).
In a survey conducted in 1968, thirty-seven percent of the West German population favored
re-licensing of the KPD. The leaders of the Social Democratic Party have been against the
outlawing of the KPD primarily because they feel that allowing the KPD to function will
improve relations with the East Bloc.
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21(2) are operative rather than declarative. The party becomes unconstitu-
tional only when the court adjudges it so. The court may abolish a consti-
tutional entity, but it may not proscribe doctrines.1 66
Thus, all constitutional entities are subject to immutable constitutional
norms. So immutable are these norms that if a government comes to power
by popular vote, and that government is contrary to those basic democratic
principles, the citizens of the state have a constitutionally protected right to
resist that government. This subordinate position of government to consti-
tutional norms was recognized in the KPD decision and, in 1968, Vyas
specifically added to the FRG Constitution. 67
The German normative approach is in sharp contrast to the more positivist
approach of the United States. In the United States, abstract doctrine or
party goals alone cannot be a basis for criminality. As long as a party tries
to achieve its goals by means other than advocating the violent overthrow
of the present government, the party and its membership are protected.
Chief Justice Vinson viewed the right of a particular government to protect
itself as superior to every other value. 68 Thus, there is no constitutionally
recognized right to urge resistance against the present government of the
United States. Consequently, there is arguably little place for the Communist
Party in American political life.
VIII. CONVENTIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS
The judicial opinions and legislation dealing with subversive political
parties have led to what commentators have called a paradox. 69 The paradox
of freedom arises when democratic process is used to gain power by those
who will destroy the democratic process. The German Constitutional Court
denies anti-democratic parties access to the democratic process. The United
States Supreme Court, however, has declared that the United States Consti-
tution does not deny groups with anti-democratic ideas the use of the
democratic process unless they advocate achieving power by anti-democratic
means. One commentator has noted that the United States Constitution does
not place any substantive limits on procedurally lawful change. 170 Neverthe-
less, the United States effectively prevented the Communist Party from
participating in the democratic process for two decades because the Party's
major purpose was to urge a displacement of a present democratic govern-
ment by revolution.
166. KPD Decision, 5 BVerfG at 376.
167. GG art. 20(4).
168. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 498.
169. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 216-21 (1971). Justice Cardozo has stated that liberty
as a legal concept contains an underlying paradox. Liberty in the most literal sense is the
negation of law, for law is restraint, and the absence of restraint is anarchy. On the other
hand, anarchy by destroying restraint would leave liberty the exclusive possession of the strong
or the unscrupulous. B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 94 (1928).
170. Franz, supra note 149, at 85. See also, Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 692-93 (1980).
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To determine the extent of protection of free speech and access to the
political process, judicial and legislative decision makers in Germany and
the United States have attempted to balance the protection of free speech
against what they view as substantial interests of the community. This
weighing of conflicting priorities has also been undertaken by numerous
commentators, who define the scope of free speech in light of their choice
of priority. On the side of unrestricted free speech are those who argue for
an approach consistent with a free market place theory of the first amend-
ment.'" ' Contrasting this position is one that points out that in antitrust law
certain forms of speech are prohibited for the sake of competition and that,
similarly, political parties should be made to play by "the rules of the
game."' 72 John Rawls has put forth a view that, while less extreme, is still
in favor of restriction. Rawls, assuming "that the capacity for a sense of
justice is possessed by the overwhelming majority of mankind," argues that
"a just citizen should strive to preserve the Constitution with all its equal
liberties as long as liberty itself and their own freedom are not in danger
... "I Like Rawls, Professors Ernest Van den Haag and Carl Auerbach
have put forward the view that democracy is justified in denying political
privileges to those who would destroy it because of the inherent nature of
liberty.' 74 Van den Haag's and Auerbach's arguments are based on a passage
from John Stuart Mill's essay on the nature of liberty:
The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a
person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty .... But by selling
himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he forgoes any future use of
it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very
purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself
.... The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not
to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom.'7
Arguments based on the above quotation neglect that Mill was not writing
about the power of the state to prevent individuals from giving up freedom.
Although the complete passage is admittedly less than clear, it is clear that
Mill was writing about contracts between private individuals. Mill felt that
contracts between individuals that do not harm others should generally be
enforced but that some contracts, such as one to become a slave, are
171. Tribe, supra note 16, at 240 (discussion of free market theory).
172. McWhinney, supra note 141, at 308.
173. J. RAwLs, supra note 169, at 506. Rawls first claims a "priority" for liberty and then
proceeds to list the circumstances that call for its limitation. Id. at 243-50.
174. Auerbach, supra note 118, at 189; R. Ross & E. VAN DEN HAAG, THE FABRIC OF
SOCIETY 632 (1958). Auerbach questioned the effectiveness of legislation such as the Smith Act,
Internal Security Act, and Communist Control Act of 1954, which effectively drives Communists
underground. He argued that suppression has the undesirable effect of creating more intense
loyalties to the Communist Party and that the Acts may be unwise because they curb the free
public debate that would expose the totalitarian nature of the party. Auerbach, supra note 118,
at 219-20.
175. Mill, On Liberty, in 25 THE HARVARD CLASSICS 299 (1909) (quoted in Auerbach, supra
note 118, at 188).
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exceptions and should not be enforced by the state. Mill did not say that
the state should actively prevent a situation of slavery. He merely said that
the state apparatus, in upholding liberty, should not be used to enforce a
contract of slavery. It is a common idea in jurisprudence that an individual
may be at liberty to agree to a relationship without creating a correlative
right in another party.176 That is, the state may not prevent a certain type
of relationship from being formed but it will also not enforce the continuance
of the relationship once one party wants it dissolved. Mill's argument, based
on the nature of liberty, that the state should not enforce a relationship of
slavery, should not be used as an argument that the state should prevent
individuals from voting for a subversive political party.
Another statement of Mill's, more in line with Rawl's position, seems
more appropriate to this issue:
No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary,
even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they
are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation
to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the
poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when
simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when
delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of the corn-
dealer . . .."
Professor Auerbach bases his position on more than a quotation from
Mill. He also adopts a theory of Professor Popper's, based on social contract,
that there is a right to revolution only in a society that does not incorporate
agreed-upon institutional methods of change.' 78 We should, therefore, set up
institutions that avoid tyranny; that is, we should bar the anti-democratic
from the democratic process.' 79 Both Auerbach and Popper have concluded
that "even a bad policy in a democracy (as long as we work for peaceful
change) is preferable to submission to a tyranny, however wise or benevo-
lent.'' Io
In contrast to Popper's approach, Professor Alan Gewith has said that
democracy:
already involves certain basic freedoms for all men equally, and in general
equal possibility of access to political authority and influence .... Political
authority is not just if its operation violates or restricts the freedoms and
176. Mill, Representative Government, in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM, Part I11, 93 (M.
Mayer ed. 1957).
177. Mill, On Liberty, in 25 THE HARVARD CLAssics 250 (1909).
178. K. POPPER, supra note 16, at 123.
179. Id. at 265 n.4.
[W]e should claim the right to suppress [intolerant philosophies] if necessary even
by force, for it may turn out that [the intolerant] are not prepared to meet us on
the level of rational argument, but ... by the use of their fists or pistols. We
should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the
intolerants. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself
outside the law ....
Id.
180. Id. at 125.
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equalities of that method of consent which is the condition of justly
acquiring the right of governmental power.'
Gewith believes that if we restrict the means or methods of gaining political
power, we have thereby already gone a long way toward achieving the
tyranny we hoped to avoid.
Professor Riesman has also objected to the position taken by Professors
Auerbach and Popper, suggesting that it is unworkable because of the
difficulties of determining the true intentions of totalitarian groups, like the
Communists, that at times profess their affection for civil liberties and other
democratic procedures." 2 Riesman also asks whether Auerbach would ban
every group that would deny others their civil liberties. Auerbach apparently
would not go this far but would ban only those anti-democratic groups
involved in the struggle for political power." s3 This position of Auerbach's
is directly opposed to the position taken by Professor Meiklejohn that public
speech (as distinguished from libelous or riotous speech or advertising which
serves only private purposes) must be unrestricted because it is the condition
of the public purpose." 4
Perhaps the most restrictive or "confusing"' ' 5 position is taken by Judge
Bork, a former professor and Solicitor General. According to Judge Bork,
only explicit political speech should be accorded constitutional protection.
Moreover, Judge Bork suggests that within the category of political speech,
it should be constitutionally permissible to criminalize speech that advocates
overthrow of the government or violation of any law.' 6
IX. STRUCTURALIST ANALYSIS AND
A DECONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL ANALYSIS
All of these approaches, from a structuralist point of view, are seeking to
justify or understand possible answers to the paradox of freedom through
a conscious ordering of subconscious oppositions. The various approaches
disagree only on the ordering of hierarchies of foundational principles. The
structuralist would argue that these hierarchies reflect innate categories of
thought and processes of transformation from which one can recognize the
development of legal doctrine without resort to functional or historical
analysis.""
181. Gewith, Political Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 119, 143-44 (R. Brandt ed. 1962).
182. Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 PUBLIC POLICY 33, 58 (1942).
183. Auerbach, supra note 118, at 184.
184. D. MEIKLEJOHN, FREEDOM AND THE PUBLIC 107 (1965); Bloustein, The Origin, Validity
and Interrelationships of the Political Values Served by Freedom of Expression, 33 RUTGERS
L. REV. 372, 385 (1981).
185. Dworkin, Reagan's Justice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 8, 1984, at 27, 30, 31; Kalven,
Reagan's Next Justice? 1983 NATION 262.
186. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20
(1971). Judge Bork stated "[tlhere is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other
form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or
pornographic." Id.
187. Hermann, supra note 5, at 1192.
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Structural analysis would find a major shift in doctrinal premise in the
United States, since 1930, from prohibiting political access and favoring
punishment of members of any political party with revolution as its platform,
to allowing membership and political activity as long as there is no incitement
to violence. In Germany, over the same span of time, the doctrinal shift has
been toward a greater restriction on the ability of revolutionary parties to
participate in the political process but more protection for the individual to
espouse revolutionary doctrine and even to work for and incite revolution,
in limited circumstances.
The structuralist would try to resolve these seemingly disparate approaches
by claiming that they result from the innate, primary, deep structure of
binary opposition between self and environment, which is transferred to the
deep structure of the opposition of the individual and others, and the
opposition of natural and unnatural. These deep structures are mediated in
surface or conscious structure as legal doctrine. There, the opposition is
between individual right and societal obligation.
If this analysis is indeed based on innate, unconscious structures, it is
difficult to understand (using only structural analysis) why each culture has
been transforming and mediating the same unconscious binary oppositions
into different conscious legal doctrine. Rather than start with innate binary
oppositions, the deconstructive method would instead take an approach that
examines the ruling metaphor of "presence" and its effect on the ordering
of hierarchies. The deconstructionist argues not that there are foundational
principles that need to be set in a system of priority, but that this orientation
is the result of logocentrism, which assumes an order of meaning.,88 The
deconstructive approach points out that competing positions are then merely
versions of competing logocentrisms.' 9 And, logocentrism is founded upon
the metaphor of "presence." Derrida states that, through history, analysis
has been determined by the meaning of being, which in turn has been
determined by the metaphor of "presence" in its general form. 90
Analysis thus becomes "the enterprise of returning 'strategically,' in ideal-
ization, to an origin or a 'priority' seen as simple, intact, normal, pure,
standard, and self identical, in order then to conceive of derivation . . .
188. "Logocentrism" is "the orientation of philosophy toward an order of meaning-
thought, truth, reason, logic, the Word-conceived as existing in itself, as foundation." J.
CULLER, supra note 15, at 92.
189. For example, Prof. Miller has characterized theoretical critics as those "who, primarily,
share the Socratic penchant, what Nietzsche defined as 'the unshakeable faith that thought,
using the thread of logic, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being.' " Miller, Stevens' Rock
and Criticism as Cure, II, 30 GEORGIA REVIEW 330, 335 (1976). See also J. CULLER, supra note
15, at 92-93.
190. "Presence" also includes several sub-determinations, such as:
presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, presence as substance/essence/existence
[ousia],... self presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence
of the other and of the self, intersubjectivity as the intentional phenomenon of the
ego .... Logocentrism would thus support the determination of the being of the
entity as presence.
J. DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 12.
191. Derrida, supra note 73, at 236.
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Concepts derived from the metaphor of presence create oppositions or
hierarchies in which terms or concepts belonging to the logos are basic and,
therefore, of superior value. The second term in opposition is merely the
imitation, derivation, or negation of the first. Oppositions such as presence/
absence and order/chaos are examples. Logocentrism, as Jonathan Culler
has written, assumes the priority of the first term." 2
In more conventional legal analysis, one expects to find words invested
with absolute meaning. Thus, when Rawls dealt with anti-subversive decision
making as a question of "tolerance of the intolerant,"' 3 he set up the
hierarchy tolerance/intolerance and enlisted presence to give priority to the
first term as being foundational. As with all arguments that cite this particular
instance of presence as a ground for further development, however, the
foundational concept of tolerance is already a complex construction. What
is proposed as a given can be shown to be merely a product that is dependent
or derived in ways that will deprive it of the authority of pure or simple
presence. '9 4 All signs only have meaning as difference and are, thus, de-
pendent on difference. Consequently, tolerance is given meaning only because
it is different from intolerance and is, thus, dependent on intolerance.
Culler has pointed to a more famous paradox, that of Zeno, which
demonstrates the difficulty of a system based on presence/absence and how
meaning is based on difference. The present is said to be a reality at any
given moment. But at any given moment, an arrow that is in flight is in a
particular spot and, thus, is never in motion. Culler explains that "the
presence of motion is conceivable . . . only insofar as every instant is already
marked with the traces of the past and future."' 5 Thus, motion can exist
"only if the present instant is not a foundation but merely a product of the
relations between past and future." 9 6
So must the would-be foundational principle of tolerance be derived. If
tolerance (presence) is to function, it must have the qualities that supposedly
192. Culler writes:
The authority of presence, its power of valorization, structures all our thinking.
The notions of "making clear," "grasping," "demonstrating," "revealing," and
"showing what is the case" all invoke presence. To claim ... that the "I" resists
radical doubt because it is present to itself in the act of thinking or doubting is
one sort of appeal to presence.
J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 94.
When Professor Hermann posits self and environment as an innate opposition, he assumes
a binary opposition that gives greater value to the first term in that opposition. From this set
of assumptions his structural analysis flows toward societal obligation, but it is always secondary
or exceptional to a doctrine protecting self. The deconstructionist, however, would point out
that this sort of structuralist argument is based on logocentric myth. Deconstructive method
reminds us that "self" has meaning only as it relates to and is different from environment.
Meaning for signs is dependent on difference. Indeed, to assume that self has some absolute
meaning to be set against environment is to give to self an aura of the absolute premise that
structuralists were initially instrumental in unveiling as myth.
193. J. RAWLS, supra note 169, at 216-21.
194. J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 94.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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belong to its opposite, intolerance (absence). Rather than define intolerance
in terms of tolerance, as its negation, we can treat tolerance as the effect of
a generalized intolerance, or as only a form of "diff~rance. " "Diffrance"
is a term devised by Derrida to allude to the idea that meaning in language
is not only the result of phonic difference as a condition of signification but
also an act of deferring meaning.'97 The deconstructive method maintains
that the development of language depends on the idea that signs or words
(such as tolerance) are never completely settled on an absolute meaning.
Thus "tolerance" is stripped of its absolute quality so that it can not form
part of a binary opposition that leads to paradox.
Another metaphysically imposed opposition central to anti-subversive de-
cisions is cause/effect. In the United States, words that might cause a clear
and present danger of violent overthrow of the government are proscribed.
In Germany the holding of certain goals by a political party might cause the
people to abandon the free democratic order. Causality is assumed in our
universe to be a basic principle, but deconstructing the cause/effect oppo-
sition strips it of its metaphysical significance.
Causality assumes the logical and temporal priority of cause to effect.
This structure, however, is not a given. Rather, the hierarchical opposition
of cause/effect is the product of a precise or rhetorical operation. Culler
explains: "Suppose one feels a pain. This causes one to look for a cause
and spying, perhaps, a pin, one posits a link and reverses the perceptual or
phenomenal order, pain . . . pin to produce a causal sequence, pin . . .
pain. "198 Thus the question becomes whether the second term (effect), usually
treated as secondary, does not prove to be the condition of possibility of
the first (cause). Nevertheless, the principle of causality is not illegitimate.
Rather, "the deconstruction itself relies on the notion of cause: the experience
of pain . . . causes us to discover the pin and thus causes the production of
a cause.''' 9 The effect rather than the cause, therefore, may be treated as
the origin:
By showing that the argument which elevates cause can be used to favor
effect, one uncovers and undoes the rhetorical operation responsible for
the hierarchization and one produces a significant displacement. If either
cause or effect can occupy the position of origin, then origin is no longer
originary; it loses its metaphysical privilege. ' ..
197. J. DERRIDA, POSITIONS 27 (A. Bass trans. 1981):
[D]ifferance ... is a structure and a movement no longer conceivable on the
basis of the opposition presence/absence. Differance is the systematic play of
differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing [espacement] by means of which
elements are related to one another. This spacing is the simultaneously active and
passive (the a of differance indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity,
that which cannot be governed or distributed between the terms of this opposition)
production of the intervals without which the "full" terms would not signify, would
not function.
198. J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 86.
199. Id. at 87.
200. Id. at 88.
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Deconstructed, causation is merely another concept, stripped of the authority
of presence.
When courts in Germany or the United States base their decisions, as they
have, on a concept of cause/effect or on a preference for tolerance as
opposed to intolerance, they are working in a logocentric way. What they
are describing in fact is a generalized intolerance. This intolerance, in turn,
is based on their analogues of a "reality" that assumes certain fundamental
principles such as cause and effect.
Another approach of the deconstructive method is to look for key words
in the text that reveal points at which the text is straining to impose as basic
reality what are merely logocentric conclusions. In the United States, the
structure of society and the government's right to self preservation are held
to be fundamental. In Germany, the free democratic order is the foundational
principle given the status of presence. To establish such foundations, decision
makers must take as a given, must assume the presence of, that which such
principles represent. Although both systems rely on fundamental principles,
the reality that decision makers impose and about which they feel familiar
is seemingly not the same "reality" in Germany as in the United States.
Various basic models of reality have developed, for example, including the
Lockean, 25' utilitarian,202 Hegelian,2 3 individualist, and altruistic204 models.
We are all influenced by these conflicting models of reality, aware and
pained that they clash as separate realities. When forced to reconcile them,
the language of decision makers shows the strains of logocentric imposition.
Decision makers use metaphors to make a proposition not clearly founda-
201. Locke's emphasis on natural law "led to the concept of government by consent and
limited by law." J. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 170 (2d ed. 1959). According
to Locke, "tyranny began when government invaded the natural rights of man." Id. "The
traditional culture of the United States is an applied utopia in which John Locke defines the
idea of the good." Id. at 124. Locke declared that his whole purpose in philosophy was to be
a servant to "the incomparable Mr. Newton." H. PROSCH, THE GENESIS OF TWENTIETH CENTURY
PHILOSOPHY 84 (1966).
202. At the time of the framing of the Constitution, the United States was essentially Lockean
in outlook. J. MILLER, supra note 201, at 170. But there were also elements in American society
that retained the Episcopalian and aristocratic social ideas of England. Hamilton and Jay, for
example, wanted no part of the egalitarian democracy of Locke and Jefferson and stated their
views in favor of a federalist principle. B. DUMBALD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 34 (1957). The rise
of industrialism following the Civil War created a new interest in economics, transforming the
content of the search for justice. J. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL AcrION 18 (1935). America
adopted the classical economic theory of William Stanley Jevons, which was based on Bentham's
utilitarian theory as determined by the philosophy of David Hume. F. NORTHRUP, THE MEETING
OF EAST AND WEST I1 (1966); E. KAYSER, THE GRAND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 29-30, 87 (1932).
203. Except for the period from the Treaty of Versailles to Hitler, German thought could
be traced in a continuous line to Fichte's Addresses to the German People. Northrup traces
this development through Hegel, from whom the idea developed that the institutions of society
are absolute and that opposition to those institutions can be overridden in the name of one's
society. F. NORTHRUP, supra note 202, at 206, 214, 217.
204. For a discussion of the competing rhetorical modes of individualism and altruism, see
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1713-22,
1776-78 (1976).
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tional to society appear familiar and well grounded. The use of these often
extreme metaphors exposes the insecurity of their makers.
For example, the Smith Act has been surrounded with the use of such
metaphors from the day it was first proposed. Congressman Howard Smith
of Virginia introduced the bill to the House of Representatives on March
20, 1939 with the following metaphorical extravaganza:
I realize that there are those who will seek to sabotage any effort to
suppress this wave of un-American and subversive activities, and the chief
method of doing so is to call such bills "red baiting." This term always
seems to have some magical effect on some people. Personally, I do not
see anything against "red baiting." I myself am for "red baiting." The
"reds" have been baiting loyal Americans and the American form of
government constantly, and a little "red baiting" by good, patriotic, red-
blooded American citizens with the same kind of poison bait that is being
used to weaken our system of government meets with my full approbation.
I am strong for the old philosophy of "fighting the devil with fire." 2 '
Congressman Smith had an easier time introducing this legislation than
Justice Vinson did in applying it in the Dennis case. Justice Vinson was
faced with a prior doctrine put forward by Justice Holmes, that the first
amendment right to free speech should only give way when words are used
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent 2" 6 Justice Vinson argued that the
test cannot mean that the government "must wait until the putsch is about
to be executed.""' In moving away from Justice Holmes' formulation,
Justice Vinson used extreme metaphors of personification of government
and concluded by arguing for a general relativity of concepts: "To those
who would paralyze our Government in the face of impending threat by
encasing it in a semantic straightjacket we must reply that all concepts are
rela tive .' -'2
Another deconstructive move is to pay attention to the marginal or what
was previously thought unimportant. It is usually through the process of
exclusion or marking off exceptions that hierarchies are developed. That is,
general principles are possible only through a process of excluding what does
not fit. Thus, by looking at the excluded, one defines or "houses" the
principle. In this way the general principle is dependent on the excluded.
The metaphorical play shows how the exceptions "create" the principle.
Freedom of speech and association are general principles. Justice Holmes,
in Schenck, allowed that speech could be limited such that one could be
convicted for shouting "fire" in a crowded theater. z 9 In Dennis, Justice
Vinson adopted the metaphor of fire in characterizing the limits of free
speech, and wrote of the "inflammable nature of world conditions.""" He
205. 84 CONG. REC. 2972 (1939).
206. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
207. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
208. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
209. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
210. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 511.
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again combined the metaphors of fire and government as helpless victim
when he declared, "If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot
bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added." 2 '
Justice Frankfurter, choosing among foundational principles, used a ter-
ritorial metaphor inherent in the word "danger." ' 212 He wrote in Dennis of
"conflicting claims supported by weighty title deeds" 2 3 and the "soil in
which the Bill of Rights grew." ' 2 4 He set "barren words" against "illumined"
experience, and "crystallized" constitutional provisions against an unpara-
lyzed "living instrument."125 1 Justice Frankfurter further freed himself of
Holmes' clear and present danger test by arguing that Holmes meant it to
apply only to "puny anonymities" and "impotent" speech rather than speech
that has a chance "of starting a present conflagration." 2 6
Justices Vinson and Frankfurter both wrote of speech as a value in a
hierarchy of values. Justice Vinson stated that the violent overthrow of the
government was "certainly a substantial enough interest for Government to
limit speech. Indeed, this is the ultimate value of any society, for if a society
cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, it must follow
that no subordinate value can be protected." ' 217 Justice Frankfurter adopted
the metaphor of feminine helplessness when he quoted a speech by a former
Director General of the BBC that there are "powerful forces in the world
today misusing the privileges of liberty in order to destroy her".2 ' Justice
Frankfurter also noted that "no debate is ever permanently won by shutting
ones ears or by even the most Draconian policy of silencing opponents." 2 ' 9
He indicated that we must have moved beyond the following pronouncement
attributed to J.S. Mill:
If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were
of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing
that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in
silencing mankind.22
It took the decisions of Yates, Scales, and Noto to place a limit on how
far the Court would stray from Mill's dictum. In Yates, Justice Harlan
moved to a position somewhat more protective of free speech. Quoting the
extreme metaphors used in Dennis, Justice Harlan allowed speech to be
restricted only in circumstances more extreme than Dennis seemed to indi-
211. Id.
212. The word "danger" derives from the Middle English "daunger," which meant "to be
in the lord's jurisdiction or power." E. PARTRIDGE, supra note 68, at 140 (1983).
213. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 519 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 521 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 523 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter referred to the clear and
present danger test as "a sonorous formula which is in fact only a euphemistic disguise for an
unresolved conflict." Id. at 519 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 508-09.
218. Id. at 553 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
219. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting speech by unnamed broadcasting executive).
220. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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cate. 2 ' He held the Smith Act constitutional in Yates only because it allows
the "teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced from
any effort to instigate action to that end. '22 The "abstract" is permissible;
the "concrete" is not. In Scales it was recognized that mere "nominal" or
passive membership in the CPUSA is protected by the first amendment and
that a "blanket" prohibition would be a real "danger" to legitimate political
expression. 23 In Scales, Justice Douglas avoided the metaphor of the smoth-
ering blanket, but he did use a territorial metaphor in his dissent. He argued
that we, as free persons, "should not venture again into the field of pros-
ecuting beliefs. 224 He presented the Jeffersonian position on whether peace
is best preserved by "giving energy to the government or information to the
people. This last is the most certain, and the most legitimate engine of
government." '225
The German Constitutional Court has been more consistent in imposing
its structures and hierarchies in its political party decisions. Indeed, the court
begins by viewing political parties generally as an organic part of the state.
"They are a 'necessary part of the constitutional structure' which, through
their collaboration in shaping political thinking, 'carry out the functions of
a constitutional organ.' ",226 Given this basic organic metaphor of structure,
surgery cannot be far off. It is not a very long step to reach the conclusion
that "certain basic principles, once approved in a democratic manner, must
be accepted as absolute values and, as such, must be defended resolutely
against any attack. 2 27 That is to say that the Federal Republic of Germany
has made a "conscious effort to achieve a synthesis of the principle of
tolerance and certain untouchable values of the political system. ' 28 Thus,
to be unconstitutional is to reject the values of the constitutional system.
Attitude is enough; without action, an aggressive attitude toward the system
may be proscribed even if there is no chance that this attitude will gain its
end in the foreseeable future. Opposition parties are constitutional only if
their resistance is ultimately directed toward the preservation of the existing
system. The "resistance" of the KPD, it is held, is meant to "undermine"
the existing system and is, therefore, counter-constitutional.229
CONCLUSION
Decision makers in Germany and the United States have argued from the
premise that they represent tolerant systems that are intolerant only if caused
221. Yates, 354 U.S. at 321 (quoting "putsch" language in Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509); id. at
324 (quoting catalyst metaphor from Dennis, 341 U.S. at 511).
222. Yates, 354 U.S. at 318.
223. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1960).
224. Id. at 267 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 273 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting T. JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 391-92 (Memorial ed. 1903)).
226. OUTLAWING THE COMMUNIST PARTY, supra note 148, at 12 (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 13.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 224.
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to be intolerant. A deconstructionist approach can show that in both systems
tolerance is not the foundational principle but rather a constantly redefined
intolerance. It is not that speech and association cause danger but rather
that a feeling of danger or insecurity causes speech or association to be
intolerable. It is thus the feeling of danger that causes us to define the level
of our intolerance and by which our concepts of democracy and liberty are
determined.
The deconstruction of logocentric theories does not lead to a new theory
that answers all questions, nor is it meant to. Indeed, the deconstructive
process is itself subject to logocentric premises. All "[tiheory may well be
condemned to a structural inconsistency." 23 To deconstruct an opposition
such as cause/effect, presence/absence, or tolerance/intolerance is not to
destroy it and leave in its place a single concept. Deconstruction means only
to undo and displace the opposition; to situate it differently in order to
reinstate it with a reversal that gives it a different status and impact. A
deconstructed position is shown not to be grounded on immutable principle
and, one hopes, not to be so tyrannical that it precludes the play of creative
thought in the development of new principles. Rather, deconstruction sug-
gests an answer to the question of whether we can avoid the tyranny of our
consensus and develop new principles without appearing merely arbitrary.
Honestly recognizing that our answers are part of a metaphorical process
will allow us to value them only as long as they prove to be adequate. To
value answers that conform to familiar analogues of our selves and society
is not to say our rules are arbitrary. But it will, one hopes, cause us to be
less apt to adopt or keep a doctrinal position that is ultimately harmful to
ourselves as a society.
230. J. CULLER, supra note 15, at 109.
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